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THE "IS" AND "OUGHT" OF VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS AFTER MONSANTO CO. v.
SPRAY-RITE SERVICE CORP.
Johnj. Flynn*
"'[Ojurquestfor certitude is so ardent that we pay an irrationalreverence to
a technique which uses symbols of certainty, even though experience again
and again warns us that they are delusive. "I
Great hopes and great fears accompanied the Supreme Court's
decision to review the Seventh Circuit's decision in Spray-Rite Service
Corp. v. Monsanto Co. 2 Proponents of a neoclassical economic model
of antitrust analysis, including the Reagan administration, saw Monsanto as a vehicle for bringing coherence to the analysis of vertical
market restraints. The neoclassicists hoped that the Monsanto Court
would declare purely vertical price fixing per se lawful, or at least
apply a rule of reason similar to the one applied to vertical divisions
of territories and customers after Continental T.V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 3 Opponents of legalizing vertical price fixing, on the other
hand, saw Monsanto as a serious challenge to their goal of a rule of
per se illegality for vertical price fixing. The opponents included
many members of Congress who thought that Congress had mandated per se illegality for vertical price fixing when it repealed the
exemption for state fair trade laws. 4 The Antitrust Division of the
Department ofJustice, however, favored legalizing vertical price fixing, and it improperly sought to lead the charge by way of a subsequently aborted amicus brief in the case.
Although the Supreme Court gave neither side a clear victory
or defeat, it created significant ambiguity about central issues in vertical price fixing litigation and other antitrust cases that were certain
to follow. 5 As with many other interpretations of important laws
Hugh B. Brown Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Utah.
1 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 644 n.40 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
2
684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
3 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (measuring agreements between manufacturers and retailers
restricting geographical retail sales areas by rule of reason standard).
4
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 3, 89 Stat. 801
(1975) (deleting paragraphs of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) which permitted fair trade pricing of
articles for retail sale and state enactment of nonsigner provisions).
5
Professor Hay perceptively explored this result in Hay, Vertical Restraints After
Monsanto, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 418 (1985); see also Floyd, Vertical Antitrust Conspiracies
After Monsanto and Russell Stover, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 269 (1985).
*
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during times of doctrinal or economic upheaval or following significant changes in the Court's membership, the Monsanto decision is
not satisfying. Monsanto reflects deep problems with the Burger
Court's decision making. By using Monsanto and its progeny to illustrate problems with the Court's values and methodology in analyzing antitrust issues, this Article seeks to explore these deeper
implications, for their significance for antitrust litigation reaches beyond vertical restraint cases.
Part I of this Article examines Monsanto and the issues that decision left unresolved. Part II examines post-Monsanto lower court decisions dealing with these open issues. Rather than attempting to
reconcile these often contrary rulings, this survey demonstrates
that, absent Supreme Court guidance, lower courts are reaching opposite conclusions on similar facts. Finally, Part III discusses the
flaws of the neoclassital approach to antitrust adjudication. The Article concludes that neoclassicists fail to respect the antitrust laws'
proper consideration of social and political values and that courts
adopting the neoclassical argument injudiciously invade the legislature's role.
I
MONSANTO: ITS LEGAL AND DOCTRINAL SHORTCOMINGS

A.

Unresolved Legal Issues

The Monsanto Court held that there was sufficient evidence at
trial to find that Monsanto unlawfully terminated the plaintiff's distributorship of Monsanto herbicides. 6 Specifically, the Court upheld
the jury's finding that Monsanto terminated the plaintiff, a price-cutting distributor, "pursuant to a price-fixing conspiracy between
Monsanto and its distributors" 7 to fix the resale price of Monsanto's
herbicides. The Court also found sufficient evidence of a causal
connection between the conspiracy to fix prices and the plaintiff's
antitrust injury to sustain a damage award under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.8 Beyond the scope of the immediate controversy,
however, the decision left at least four issues unresolved:
(1) whether the Court will continue to hold vertical price fixing a per
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act; (2) what constitutes
sufficient evidence to send to ajury the questions of whether there is
a contract, combination or conspiracy to fix prices and whether that
conspiracy caused antitrust injury to the plaintiff; (3) what conduct
6
7
8

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 767-68. Section I of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combi-

nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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can courts identify as price fixing within the meaning of the per se
rule prohibiting vertical price fixing; and (4) what factors identify
conduct as horizontal or vertical for purposes of analyzing distribution restraints under section 1 of the Sherman Act?
The issue of the per se status of vertical price fixing remains
unclear. Attempts by the Solicitor General and other amid to raise
the issue before the Supreme Court were rejected because neither
party had raised the issue in the courts below. 9 Justice Brennan's
concurrence shed no light on this issue, but it underscored the majority opinion's ambiguity with regard to the future status of the per
se rule against vertical price fixing. By stressing Congressional acquiesence to the rule of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 10
and the majority's "adhere[nce] to that rule,""I Justice Brennan implicitly suggested that the Court's refusal to reconsider the per se
rule fell short of a ringing endorsement.
The second issue Monsanto left unclear deals with the evidence
sufficient to prove contract, combination or conspiracy and a causal
connection between the conspiracy and the plaintiff's alleged antitrust injury. Instead of providing criteria for future litigation, the
Court's legal analysis focused on rejecting appellate court dicta asserting that "proof of termination following competitor complaints
is sufficient to support an inference of concerted action."' 12 The
Monsanto Court did find, however, sufficient evidence for the jury to
infer a conspiracy from certain facts unique to this case.' 3 The
Court's naked identification of evidence sufficient in this case falls
woefully short of a general test for evidentiary sufficiency, leaving
future courts to guess where the Court meant the line dividing
14
judge and jury functions to fall.
9 465 U.S. at 761 n.7.

10

220 U.S. 373 (1911).
465 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J., concurring).
12
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (7th Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
13
Specifically, the Court found sufficient evidence in the following: (1) competitor
complaints plus efforts by Monsanto employees to coerce other price cutters into line
(including communicating with one price cutter's parent corporation to secure adherence to Monsanto's resale prices); (2) Monsanto's failure to fill the plaintiff's herbicide
orders during the shipping season (when the product was in short supply) in order to
force compliance with suggested prices; and (3) a distributor's newsletter reporting a
meeting with Monsanto officials who discussed efforts "to get the market in order" and
represented that Monsanto agreed not to undercut retailer prices in its own retail outlets. 465 U.S. at 765-66 & n.10.
14 Justice Powell, writing for the majority in the post-Monsanto decision of Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986), characterized Monsanto as
holding that "conduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy." Id. at 1357.
This reading of Monsanto appears to increase the standard of proof for the conspiracy
element of the offense. In Monsanto the Court held that "[t]here must be evidence that
11
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The Monsanto Court also neglected an opportunity to define
more clearly the concept of "price fixing" prohibited by the per se
rule. The Court refused to address the argument proffered by the
Solicitor General as amicus that:
If a supplier adopts a bona fide distribution program that includes
nonprice restraints and if that program is reasonably addressed to
distribution problems, the case must be judged by the rule of reason unless the plaintiff can show-by direct or circumstantial evidence-an explicit agreement about the prices distributors are to
charge. 15
The Court sidestepped this question by noting that Monsanto had
conceded the applicability of the per se rule if nonprice restraints
were found part of a price fixing conspiracy. 1 6 The Court acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a line between price and nonprice
vertical restraints, 17 but offered little guidance to help resolve the
difficulty. Consequently, subsequent courts have had to answer
questions such as: (1) whether the conduct at issue should be categorized as "price fixing" within the meaning of the per se rule;
(2) whether the conduct fits some other per se category; or
(3) whether the conduct is some other form of vertical restraint to
be measured on a more generous, but undefined, rule of reason
basis.
The final issue left unresolved by Monsanto is the distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints. Monsanto implicitly raised
this issue because Monsanto functioned as a dual distributor, selling
its herbicides both to distributors and in its own retail outlets.' 8
Although the Court did not make much of this fact, the opinion
does note that the plaintiff's evidence to prove conspiracy included
a distributor's newsletter reporting Monsanto's alleged agreement
tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors
were acting independently.... [Tihe antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others 'had a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.' " 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637
F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)). To the extent that Afatsushita held that one may use motivations in the neoclassical model's hypothetical world to
determine whether real-world evidence tends to prove a conscious commitment to a
common scheme, the opinion goes considerably further than the Monsanto holding on
the questions of what evidence is legally sufficient to prove conspiracy and whether the
factual determination is one for court or jury.
15
Summary of Argument Before the Court, 52 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1983)
(No. 82-914); see generally Comment, Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.: TheJustice
Department Challenges The Per Se Rule Against Resale Price Maintenance, 46 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 171 (1984) (arguing that per se rule should govern legality of both vertical nonprice restraints and resale price maintenance plans).
16 465 U.S. at 759 n.6.
17 Id. at 762.
18 See id. at 766.
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to set the price of Monsanto herbicides at its own retail outlets at or
above the suggested retail price. 19 Hence, one may argue that Monsanto is really a horizontal price fixing case involving a conspiracy
among Monsanto's retailers. This horizontal aspect of the case
could be used to distinguish Monsanto from future cases in which the
conspiracy is more clearly vertical.
B.

Unresolved Doctrinal Issues

A more general problem lies at the heart of the Monsanto decision. The question of how the moral or normative objectives of the
relevant legal standards should inform the application of those standards underlies the resolution of any legal dispute. Stated another
way, a court engaged in the application of a legal standard is also
engaged in a complex series of "ought" decisions requiring a determination of the facts and rules relevant to the dispute.
The central paradox of legal reasoning is that whereas application of the appropriate rule presupposes knowledge of the relevant
facts, determination of the relevancy of a given fact presupposes a
knowledge of the appropriate rule. In addition, courts must interpret the concepts invoked by the rules in light of the facts found
relevant and decide how those concepts ought to apply in light of
the consequences such an interpretation will have in this and future
cases. Unlike the deductive and mechanical application of premises
to facts in some forms of economic analysis, 20 legal analysis should
explore the moral and factual assumptions hidden in premises. Informal logic, not deductive logic, constitutes the essence of legal
reasoning. It is in this sense that concepts are tools of analysis in
law and that every legal decision is unavoidably a moral decision-a
21
question of "ought."
Different schools of antitrust thought disagree over the deeper
social and economic values and objectives underlying the antitrust
laws and how courts should bring those values to bear upon a specific dispute. Ought courts view antitrust solely as a means for
achieving economic "efficiency," as that concept has been variously
defined, 22 or ought they regard antitrust as invoking broader policy
considerations encompassing additional economic, social and polit19
20

Id. at 766.
See Mason, Some Negative Thoughts on Friedman'sPositive Economics, 3 J.PoST KEYNE-

SIAN ECON. 235 (1980).
See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 3-7 (1959).
22 The concept "efficiency" has been used to mean, among other things, "productive" efficiency and "allocative" efficiency. See, e.g., Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 485 (1980). Often the same author invokes first one, then another, and sometimes hybrid concepts of efficiency when discussing antitrust policy. See Peritz, The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination
21
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ical values? 2 3 Judge Posner, a relentless advocate of the deductive
logic methodology inherent in neoclassical economic analysis,
summed up succinctly the consequences of the "economic efficiency" approach in Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries24:
The welfare of a particular competitor who may be hurt as the
result of some trade practice is the concern not of the federal antitrust laws ....but of state unfair competition law ....

The exclusion of competitors is cause for antitrust concern

25
only if it impairs the health of the competitive process itself.

One of many difficulties with Posner's position and such cliches as
"the 'antitrust laws.., were enacted for the protection of competition,
not competitors,' "26 is that courts, including the Supreme Court,
continue to grant antitrust relief in cases lacking any showing of injury to "competition" in Posner's sense. Indeed, in the context of
per se violations courts assume an injury to competition even
though the proof often shows only injury to a particular competitor.
If one adopts Posner's view of antitrust, and the libertarian consequences its premises and rigid reliance upon deductive logic compel, then proof of injury to competition in a relevant market, or even
proof of a reduction in output, 27 should be a prerequisite to a find28
ing of illegality for conduct currently classified as per se illegal.
Argument, 1984 DuxE L.J. 1205, 1287 (1984) (discussing confusion in Richard Posner's
writings concerning various meanings of "efficiency").
23
Among the social or political values antitrust policy might invoke is ensuring that
an individual's or a firm's success or failure be guaranteed by a competitive process free
from unreasonable collective or unilateral acts of others, without regard for whether the
challenged conduct necessarily injures competition by increasing price above marginal
cost or reducing output. Professor Fox has defined the "qualitative" goals of antitrust
policy: "There are four major historical goals of antitrust, and all should continue to be
respected. These are: (1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity
to compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the competition process as market governor." Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv.1140, 1182 (1981); see also infra notes 219-27 and
accompanying text.
24
749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
25 Id. at 394.
26 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14 (1984)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), opinion reflecting the
Warren Court's view that competition is dynamic, not static).
27 See Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 171 (1977).
28 Judge Easterbrook, Judge Posner's co-author of ANrrrusT: CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS (2d ed. 1981), adopted, or a least came close to adopting,
such an approach in Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985). The
case involved a horizontal division of product markets by the plaintiff/landlord, who ran
an appliance business, and the defendant/tenant, who owned a building supply business. Before plaintiff constructed a building to house both businesses, the parties negotiated a covenant running with the land which restricted each of them from selling
certain products carried by the other. When the tenant realized that the restriction prevented it from running advertising for all of its stores on certain products because the
products were not available in the store subject to the covenant, it advised the landlord
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Given this requirement and the other assumptions of the neoclassical model, very little collaborative conduct would be of antitrust
concern, with the possible exception of horizontal price fixing by
dominant firms. Even then, neoclassicists might claim that market
forces would remedy the problem more efficiently than government
interference through the legal process.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 2 9 purported to reject the position asserted by the
dissent below that social and political values are goals that courts
are bound to protect in giving meaning to and applying the antitrust
laws. Justice Powell observed that"[c]ompetitive economies have
social and political as well as economic advantages .... but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks." 3 0 Justice Powell's statement hardly represents
a resounding rejection of injecting social and economic values and
broader economic goals into the interpretation of antitrust concepts, nor does it endorse a complete acceptance of limiting antitrust analysis to considerations of economic efficiency as defined by
neoclassical economic analysis. Yet the statement, particularly when
coupled withJustice Powell's acknowledgment of "free rider" analysis in Monsanto,3 1 is a sufficient endorsement of efficiency to raise
several questions. Among other issues, Powell's statement calls into
question whether courts should require proof of adverse market efthat it would no longer abide by the covenant. The tenant defended a suit to enforce the
covenant by claiming that the covenant was an illegal division of markets, 776 F.2d at
187-88, and therefore void under the Illinois Antitrust Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 60
(1975), a statute patterned after federal antitrust laws.
The case was removed to a federal district court which held the covenant an illegal
horizontal division of product markets. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 1985-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 66,450 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985). In the course of
reversing the district court, Judge Easterbrook wrote:
Although federal law treats almost all contracts allocating products and
markets as unlawful per se, . . . the per se rule is designed for "naked"

restraints rather than agreements that facilitate productive activity....
Cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for people to
cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others, and cooperation facilitates efficient production .... Antitrust law is designed to
ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment. When cooperation contributes to productivity through integration of efforts, the
Rule of Reason is the norm.
776 F.2d at 188 (citations omitted). Distinguishing "ancillary" from "naked" restraints,
Judge Easterbrook found the restraint ancillary because the agreement was a cooperative venture with "prospects for increasing output." Id. at 190. He reasoned that a
showing of "market power" is required before such a restraint may be struck down. Id.
at 191. Finding none, the court reversed the district court's opinion that the horizontal
restraint dividing markets was illegal. Id.
29 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
30 Id. at 53 n.21 (citations omitted).
31
465 U.S. at 762-63.
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fects in all section 1 cases, whether they should require proof of a
relevant market in all rule of reason cases, whether the Supreme
Court is preparing to abandon the per se rule against vertical price
fixing, and whether trial courts should interpret the antitrust standards strictly to ensure that a restraint deemed illegal injures both
consumers generally and targeted firms.
Judicial disagreement over the goals of antitrust (the "oughts")
rumbles beneath the surface of post-Monsanto opinions. Indeed,
Monsanto's condemnation of vertical price fixing on a per se basis
ensures perpetuation of the ideological conflict. While the Monsanto
majority held vertical price fixing illegal per se because such agreements deprive dealers of the ability to exercise judgment in "making
independent pricing decisions," 3 2 it made no mention of the plaintiff's need to prove an injury to consumers by demonstrating that
the manufacturer's marketing strategy restricted output or fixed
prices above marginal cost.
Judicial condemnation of horizontal and other restraints on a
per se basis, without proof of a relevant market and injury to competition in that market, suggests a judicial recognition that Congress
intended the antitrust laws to serve goals other than preventing reductions in output.3 3 The Monsanto Court's failure to resolve this
issue has spawned continuing ideological controversy over the goals
of antitrust and the identity and definition of the elements of the per
se and rule of reason standards-controversy which is reflected in
the litigation following that case.
II
THE

"Is"

OF LOWER COURT DECISIONS FOLLOWING
MONSANTO

By the first quarter of 1986, over sixty reported antitrust decisions and several unreported decisions had cited Monsanto. Perhaps
a dozen other cases did not cite Monsanto directly but did involve
vertical restraints relevant to the policies discussed therein. All
these cases share a general characteristic, one that should surprise
no one familiar with the Reagan administration's antitrust ideology:
none have been brought by the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice.
Another striking feature of these cases is that more than half
have involved rulings on motions for summary judgment or directed
32 Id. at 762. Justice Powell also recognized the validity of a manufacturer's control
over "marketing strategy," id., for his products in order to "assure an efficient distribution system," id. at 763.
33 A dealer's freedom to compete on the merits would be an example of an antitrust
goal unrelated to output reduction. See Fox, supra note 23, at 1169.
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verdict in favor of defendants. In many of the summary judgment
cases, courts cite precedent suggesting that summary judgment
should rarely be granted in antitrust cases where intent and motive
play a major role. 34 Nevertheless, many of the same courts grant, or
affirm the granting of, the summary judgment motion. Judges often
grant preliminary motions with little or no mention of the constitutional right to ajury trial on contested matters of fact or of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure philosophy of de-emphasizing
pleadings. Indeed, judges frequently use preliminary motions in
ways which suggest that code pleading has returned to federal
courts in antitrust cases. 3 5 Surprisingly, these particularly significant
36
issues are little noticed in post-Monsanto litigation.
The post-Monsanto decisions may be categorized according to
the issues with which they deal: (1) the evidence sufficient to allow
the fact-finder to infer the existence of a conspiracy and whether the
conspiracy caused antitrust injury; 3 7 (2) whether the conspiratorial
38
activity is price fixing or some other form of per se illegal conduct;
39
and (3) whether the conduct involved is horizontal or vertical. Litigation concerning these issues continues against the background
controversy over the goals of antitrust policy.
34 Lower courts regularly cite the standard set forth in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ("summary procedures should be used sparingly
in complex litigation where motive and intent play leading roles"). See, e.g., Terry's
Floor Fashions Inc. v. Burlington Indus., 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Poller but
granting summary judgment for defendant).
35 See, e.g., Mueller v. Rayon Consultants, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.) (function of pleading under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give fair notice of claim
asserted, and no more), appealdenied, 271 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Trebuhs Realty
Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 12 F.R.D. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Shepard v. Popular Publications, 10 F.R.D. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
36
One could interpret Monsanto as dealing with the appropriate functions ofjudge
and jury in vertical restraint cases or even as an indirect endorsement of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure's notice pleading philosophy. These two issues supplement the
question of the character and degree of evidence necessary to prove the elements of an
antitrust conspiracy involving vertical or other restraints.
The post-Monsanto cases share another general characteristic: former law professors are writing many of the significant antitrust decisions. See Will v. Comprehensive
Accounting Corp.,, 776 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,J.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1659 (1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.);Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.) (Posner,
J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380
(7th Cir. 1984) (Posner,J.); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.
1984) (Breyer,J.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 (1985). Some of thesejudges use the cases
before them to criticize still-binding Supreme Court opinions in extensive dicta. The
institutional constraints on a lower court judge, namely, following the decisions of the
Supreme Court and deferring to congressional purposes in enacting economic regulation, apparently carry little weight with some of the appointees from the academic ranks.
:57 See i'fra notes 42-94 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 102-52 and accompanying text.
3.) See infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence to Infer Conspiracy

Following Monsanto, a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy in violation
of the antitrust laws must prove: (1) a "conscious commitment to a
common scheme"; and (2) that the alleged conspiracy caused an antitrust injury to the plaintiff.40 Some of the post-Monsanto cases were
filed or tried prior to Monsanto, with motions or appeals argued after
the Supreme Court's decision. Hence, some of these cases involve
mere competitor complaints followed by termination of the plaintiff
and lack the additional "plus" necessary to prove a "conscious commitment to a common scheme," a "unity of purpose," or a "meeting
of the minds." 4 1 Although courts usually dismiss such cases with a
citation to Monsanto or the Colgate doctrine's 4 2 recognition of the
right of traders to unilaterally refuse to deal, 4 3 some of these cases
present close questions as to whether there was sufficient evidence
of a "plus" to permit a jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy. 4 4
Other decisions confuse the question of whether there was any conSee Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 767.
See National Marine Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir.
1985); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit de Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d
Cir. 1985); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1513 (1986); McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp. 899 (M.D.
Pa. 1984).
42
Colgate provides:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell.
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). For an argument that the
Colgate doctrine should be abolished, see Andersen, The Antitrust Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices-The Case For Presumptive Illegality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 763
(1979); see also Note, A Definition of Agreement: Identifying Purely UnilateralConduct in Vertical
Price Restriction Cases, 19 VAL. U.L. REV. 766 (1985) (proposing motive as basis for distinguishing permissible vertical price restraints).
43
See, e.g., Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 374 (3d Cir.
1985) (manufacturer's unilateral decision to rearrange its distribution scheme does not
violate § I of the Sherman Act); Landmark Dev.Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369,
372 (9th Cir. 1985) (evidence of exchange of correspondence between manufacturer
and complaining distributor too "highly ambiguous" to justify inference of agreement
to fix prices). See also Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1985)
(insufficient evidence to infer conspiracy); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d
922 (1st Cir. 1984) (no conspiracy where entities are not competitors in same market
and no independent decision-making was compromised), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2040
(1985); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 617 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (same), aff'd,
797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (same), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F.
Supp. 43 (D. Mass. 1984) (same).
44
See National Marine Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir.
1985); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit de Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d
Cir. 1985).
40
41
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spiracy with that of whether the conspiracy was one to "fix prices." ' 4 5
Still other decisions dispose of the case on the ground of insufficient
evidence of a causal connection between the agreement to fix prices
and antitrust injury to the plaintiff.4 6 None of the opinions adequately discuss whether such issues should be determined by the
judge or the jury.
Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb4 7 presents a rare case in
which the plaintiff had no difficulty proving a contract, combination,
or conspiracy. The defendant newspaper publisher had contracts
with its "independent contractor" distributors which fixed the maximum price at which they could resell its newspapers. DespiteJudge
48
Posner's claim in another case that the rule of Albrecht v. Herald Co.
condemning maximum resale price maintenance "is in doubt after
Continental T.V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.," 49 the Ninth Circuit in
Northwest Publications found no indication that the Supreme Court
had questioned Albrecht's per se rule. 50 The court went on to find,
however, that the plaintiff had failed to show that the contract fixing
maximum prices had caused it not to raise prices; the evidence instead supported a finding that other market factors prevented plaintiff from raising prices.
Although the Northwest Publications court did not refer to Monsanto, its decision mirrors Monsanto's two-step analysis. 5 1 The Ninth
Circuit's opinion ignores, however, the issue of whether such questions ought to be decided by a judge or a jury.
Other cases have focused on the first part of the Monsanto conspiracy test, discussing the minimum level of evidence required to
send to the jury the question of whether there was a conscious commitment to a common scheme. In NationalMarineElectronicsDistributors, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 52 a mail-order distributor of Raytheon's
marine electronics products claimed that Raytheon had conspired
45 See Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985);
O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 (D.C. Cal. 1985), aft'd, 792
F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp.
822 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985).
46
Other cases have involved unusual fact patterns which produce equally unusual
analyses. See Beutler Sheetmetal Works v. McMorgan & Co., 616 F. Supp. 453 (N.D.
Cal. 1985) (absence of anticompetitive purpose by builders and lenders in acquiescing
to "union-only" policy for mortgage funds from union trust fund justified dismissal of
complaint; trust fund could not be co-conspirator absent competition with nonunion
subcontractors denied funding).
47
752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985).

48
49

390 U.S. 145 (1968).

Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir.), cer.
denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
50
511
52

752 F.2d at 475.

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985).
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with its regular distributors to terminate plaintiff's distributorship.
The evidence was unclear about whether dealer complaints were
based on plaintiff's pricing or lack of a service facility53 and whether
the dealer complaints also included threats to discontinue dealing
54
with Raytheon if it continued to do business with the plaintiff.
Raytheon countered the plaintiff's claim by arguing that its termination of the plaintiff arose from an internal review resulting in a decision against selling through mail-order dealers. The district court
directed a verdict for Raytheon on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to produce sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of conspiracy. Citing Monsanto, the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that there was a lack of evidence that Raytheon and its dealers "schemed to terminate the plaintiff for the purpose of restraining price competition." 5 5 Citing evidence that the defendant
dictated neither the plaintiff's nor any of its other dealers' prices,
the court found the evidence insufficient to prove a conspiracy to
restrain prices.
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, reaffirmed its finding of
sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to withstand a motion for summary judgement in Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries,5 6 From
1975 until 1979, the Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
had operated and subsidized a program whereby residential customers could upgrade the insulation of their homes. Participants could
choose either PSC-approved brands of rockwool, fiberglass, or cellulose insulation. The defendant, Rockwool Industries, sold the
only brand of rockwool insulation so approved. 57 The plaintiff in
Black Gold claimed that the defendant had illegally tied the sale of
blown rockwool insulation to the sale of rockwool insulation in batts
and had engaged in a concerted refusal to deal 58 in the fiberglass
batt insulation. The court upheld the trial court's directed verdict
for the defendant on the plaintiff's tying claim, but reversed the
lower court's directed verdict for the defendant on the plaintiff's
allegation of a concerted refusal to deal. The court of appeals found
that the evidence demonstrated a firm policy of refusing to deal with
buyers who refused to buy both forms of its insulation, that the defendant had continued to deal with the plaintiff's competitors who
53 Id. at 191-92.
54 Id. at 192. There was also evidence that Raytheon agreed to supply the plaintiff
on the condition that the plaintiff not advertise its prices for certain Raytheon products
in its catalogues. Id.
55 Id. at 192-93.
56 729 F.2d 676, rehg denied, 732 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, 469 U.S. 854
(1984)). The Tenth Circuit issued its original opinion in Black Gold before the Supreme
Court's Monsanto decision; after Monsanto, the Tenth Circuit denied a rehearing.
57 729 F.2d 676, 679.
58 Id.
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purchased both forms of insulation, and that the defendant had terminated the plaintiff for refusing to do so. 59 The court also found
evidence from which a jury could infer that the defendant, by
manipulating its prices, was aiding the plaintiff's competitor to
60
regain a customer lost to the plaintiff.
In its opinion denying a rehearing after Monsanto, the Tenth
Circuit reaffirmed its prior holding, citing a specific example of evidence that the Monsanto Court deemed sufficient to permit inferring
the existence of a conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit stated:
Among other things, the [Monsanto] Court noted that a threat to
cut off a nonacquiescing distributor during a time when the product is in short supply is probative evidence of concerted action
because it permits a jury to conclude that the manufacturer
"sought this agreement at a time when it was able to use supply as
a lever to force compliance." 61
Post-Monsanto cases exhibit considerable disagreement over the degree to which coercion can transform unilateral, and thus protected,
conduct into conduct amounting to a "conscious commitment to a
common scheme." The Monsanto opinion expressly sanctions the
announcement of a Colgate-type policy, that is, a unilateral refusal to
deal with price cutters, 62 even though this policy often causes the
distributor to forego his or her independent pricing discretion.
Although Monsanto sanctions such conduct when purely unilateral, it
also suggests that coercion can constitute evidence of a "plus" from
which, in addition to complaints and termination, a jury may infer a
section 1 conspiracy.
Several lower courts faced with resolving this conflict held that
finding coercion to follow a seller's suggested prices allows ajury to
find a price fixing conspiracy, either between the seller and the complaining buyer or between the seller and others. In these cases,
courts found that evidence of dealer complaints permitted an inference that the seller had agreed with the complaining dealers to terminate the plaintiff.63 In one case, for example, the Tenth Circuit
5.9 Id.
60
Id.
61
Black

Gold, Ltd., 732 F.2d at 780 (quotingMonsanto, 465 U.S. at 765 n. 10); see also
Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204 (N.D.III. 1985) (refusing summary judgment ivhere jury could infer conspiracy from competing distributor's threats
to manufacturer).
62
.llonsanlo, 465 U.S. at 761 ("A manufacturer of course generally has a right to
deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently....
Under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its resale prices in advance and refuse to
deal with those who fail to comply.") (citations omitted).
63
See, e.g., World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467 (1Oth Cir.),
tert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir.
1985); Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985).
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stated that an agreement may be inferred in circumstances where
the defendant has taken action "adverse to . . . [the plaintiff] as a
means of enforcing price fixing . . . by showing that although he
refused to acquiesce in the price fixing, other buyers agreed to the
arrangement." 64 Other courts have held that a supplier engages in
an illegal agreement where competing dealers have formed a horizontal conspiracy to terminate the plaintiff and secured the supplier's acquiescence in the scheme. 6 5 A sufficient basis for a factfinder to infer an agreement, even if not coercive, has also been
found in meetings between a defendant prime contractor and labor
unions followed by picketing of ajob site designed to cause the defendant to cease dealing with a plaintiff subcontractor employing
workers from different unions, 6 6 and in termination of a plaintiff
due to recommendations or manipulation by a seller's employees or
agents who were acting independently as competitors of the
67
plaintiff.
In a newspaper distributor case where an independent contractor-distributor claimed that publication of a suggested retail price to
home subscribers, collection of subscriber bills at the suggested retail price, and promotions to home subscribers prevented it from
exercising its independent pricing discretion, the court did not find
sufficient coercion to allow finding an agreement. In Dunn v. Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc.,6 8 the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the wellknown Albrecht v. Herald Co. footnote 6 9 suggesting that it was not a
"frivolous contention" for Albrecht to claim a conspiracy between
the newspaper and his customers to maintain maximum prices. The
Ninth Circuit instead read Albrecht as holding not that there was a
combination between the newspaper and Albrecht's customers, but
only that it was not "frivolous" to suggest the possibility. The court
refused to find that customer complaints, plus the newspaper's noti64 World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1475 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985).
65 See Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1985); Motive Parts
Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985); Marco Holding Co. v. Lear
Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1985). But see National Marine Elec. Distribs.,
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985).
66 James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1984).
67 See Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., 769 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1985)
(conspiracy between shoe marketer and its distributor who operated retail stores to cut
off plaintiff for underpricing distributor); Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co.,
734 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir.) (conspiracy between insurance company, former vice-president,
employee, and insurance agency established by vice-president through front while in
insurance company's employ to take over plaintiff's agency by terminating its relationship with defendant insurance company), cert. denied, Agency Holding Corp. v. MalleyDuff & Assocs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
68 735 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1984).
69 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968).
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fication to its customers of its suggested retail price, amounted to a
coerced agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to maintain retail prices. The court noted that the defendants were free to
charge whatever price they liked, although "the carriers might have
blushed to explain to their customers why they charged more than
' 70
the suggested subscription prices."
The Sixth Circuit found coercion sufficient to allow a jury to
infer agreement where a franchiser imposed unreasonable
paperwork requirements on a franchisee as part of a scheme
designed to force franchisees to buy from sources and sell at prices
determined by the franchiser. In Bender v. Southland Corp.,71 the
court found that the franchiser's "7-Eleven" franchisee "Retail Accounting System" could be seen as an attempt to coerce franchisee
compliance 72 and therefore reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant. In addition to the paperwork
burden, the court relied on evidence of special surveillance of the
plaintiff's accounts, threats to terminate the plaintiff, refusal to
honor the plaintiff's price change reports resulting in inventory
shortages chargeable to plaintiff, delayed payroll payment from
funds withheld from the franchisee for that purpose, and visits by
Southland employees demanding that the plaintiff raise prices on
items sold below the defendant's suggested price. 7 3 Defining
"[c]oercion in the vertical price fixing context" as "actual or
threatened affirmative action beyond suggestion or persuasion,
taken by a defendant in order to induce a plaintiff to follow the
defendants' prices," ' 74 the court found sufficient evidence of a coerced agreement to merit a trial.
The Ninth Circuit, relying on its pre-Monsanto decision in Filco
v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. 7 5 has taken a somewhat different approach to coercion. In Filco the court held that competitor complaints, followed by termination, are insufficient evidence from
which to infer agreement. 7 6 Instead, a plaintiff must show concerted
action and an attempt to coerce the plaintiff to abide by suggested
prices in order to reach the jury. In addition, the Ninth Circuit held
that plaintiffs may establish the element of causation by evidence of:
(1) the volume and intensity of complaints; (2) the time gap between
receipt of the complaints and termination; and (3) whether the de735 F.2d at 1187.
749 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1984).
72 The defendant's system imposed extensive reporting requirements which the defendant failed to explain adequately. See id. at 1200-10, 1212-14.
73 Id. at 1212-13.
74 Id. at 1213.
75 709 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
76 Id. at 1263.
70

71
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fendant had a valid, independent reason for the termination. 7 7
Subsequent courts have used elements of Filco's three-part
causal test to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to send
the conspiracy question to the jury. In particular, courts have focused on whether a defendant had a business reason for terminating
a distributor, whether a conspiracy was one to fix prices, 78 and
whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of causation.7 9
Finding a good business reason, such as the defendant's undertaking an independent study of changing its marketing system in a way
which the plaintiff claims caused termination, has sufficed to refute
80
a claim of a dealer-supplier conspiracy to terminate the plaintiff.
Similarly, courts have deemed vertical conduct required by government regulation a sufficient business reason to defeat a conspiracy
claim. 8 1
In one case, however, where the plaintiff demonstrated that the
defendants' claimed business justification was factually unsupported
or highly questionable, the court chose to send the question of conspiracy to the jury. In Fragale& Sons Beverage v. Dill,8 2 two independent wholesalers promised to supply a retailer taking over a beer
outlet in Cameron County, Pennsylvania, only to change their minds
and refuse to deal with the plaintiff later. 83 The plaintiff proved that
the defendant wholesalers had met with the only other beer distributor in the county just prior to notifying the plaintiff that they would
not supply his business.8 4 The defendants claimed that they refused
to deal with the plaintiff because they had made independent business decisions that Cameron County was too small to support two
distributors, that the plaintiff's demand was too small to justify the
paperwork, and that the plaintiff was inexperienced in the business
77 Id. at 1264. The court noted, "Although none of these factors alone would be
strong evidence of illegal concerted action, a combination of them could provide the
necessary nexus between complaints and termination and at least allow the plaintiff to
present his case to the jury." Id. at 1265.
78 See Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1985); O.S.C. Corp. v.
Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.
1986); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
aft'd, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985).
79
See Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d
Cir. 1985); Landmark Dev. Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1985);
Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43 (D. Mass. 1984).
80 See Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d
Cir. 1985); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Cal.
1984), afl'd, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F.
Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), af'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986).
81 See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
82 760 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1985).
83
Id. at 47 1.
84
Id. at 474.
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of beer retailing. 5 The plaintiff contested these claims with evidence that the defendants served smaller areas than Cameron
County and smaller accounts than his. The court noted that the
"opportunity to conspire," by itself, was insufficient evidence to
prove conspiracy, but concluded that a jury could infer a conspiracy
where the opportunity to conspire closely preceded the defendants'
repudiation of the agreement to deal.8 6 Taking the evidence of opportunity to conspire with the plaintiff's evidence undermining the
defendants' supposed business purpose, the court found sufficient
87
justification for allowing a jury to hear the case.
As noted above, one court concluded that the defendant's injurious conduct was excused and withheld the question of conspiracy
or causation from the jury where the defendant engaged in that conduct in order to comply with government regulations. In Barnes v.
Arden Mayfair, Inc.,"" the developer of a new method for sterilizing
milk to increase its shelf life claimed that several Alaskan dairies and
a shipper had conspired to exclude its product from the Alaskan
market. The plaintiff's suit against the shipper8 9 rested on the theory that the shipper had raised its rates at the dairies' insistence. 90
The shipper conceded that it had increased the plaintiff's shipping
rates in response to dairies' complaints that the product was being
shipped under the wrong Interstate Commerce Commission rate.
The court held that because the Interstate Commerce Act mandated the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff failed to produce specific evidence of conspiracy. 9 ' In so holding, the court reiterated
the Ninth Circuit's test for evaluating summary judgment motions in
antitrust conspiracy cases: "Once the allegations of conspiracy made
in the complaint are rebutted by probative evidence supporting an
alternative interpretation of a defendant's conduct, if the plaintiff
then fails to come forward with specific factual support of its allegations of conspiracy, summary judgment for the defendant becomes
proper. ' 9 2 This standard seems consistent with Monsanto's requirement of "evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently" 9 3 and the requirement of "direct or circumstantial evidence
85

86
87
88
89

90

91
92

Id. at 471-72.
Id. at 474.
Id.
759 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1985).
The plaintiff settled its dispute with the dairies. Id. at 678.
Id. at 681-83.
Id. at 682-84.
759 F.2d at 680 (quoting ALW, Inc. v. United Air Lines, 510 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir.

1975)).
93

465 U.S. at 764.
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that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others
'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective.' -4 To the extent that such standards apply at the motion stage of litigation, however, they appear
to be devices of code pleading that could seriously curb the antitrust
plaintiff's right to a jury trial on the question of conspiracy.
B.

Whether the Conduct Is Price Fixing or Some Other Form
of Per Se Illegal Activity

In Monsanto the Court acknowledged the difficulty in distributor
termination cases of applying the distinction between concerted action to set prices and concerted action on nonprice restrictions. 9 5
Unfortunately, the Court provided even less guidance on this issue
than on the question of whether evidence of conspiracy is sufficient
to send a case to a jury. Post-Monsanto litigation has grappled with
this problem by asking two fundamental questions: (1) whether the
facts as presented support a conspiracy to fix prices or merely indicate joint conduct for some other purpose;9 6 and (2) whether the
claimed conspiracy constitutes per se illegal price fixing or is some
other activity which is or ought to be considered per se illegal.
The majority opinion in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
94 Id. (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
95 465 U.S. at 762 (noting "similar or identical" economic effects).
96
Many of the cases finding a business justification by suggesting that a defendant's
conduct is unilateral and thereby rebuts evidence of a conspiracy, could also have been
decided on the ground that the conduct involved was not for the purpose of fixing
prices. For example, in Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43 (D. Mass. 1984), the defendant furniture supplier inquired of its southern dealers where the plaintiff catalog seller
was obtaining the defendant's furniture for resale. The defendant sold its furniture only
through authorized dealers whose franchise agreements contained location restrictions.
The court dismissed the case for lack of conspiracy and causation, but might have
achieved a similar result on the ground that the defendant was exercising a GTE Sylvania,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), right to enforce its location clause.
The Ninth Circuit could have reached a similar result in Landmark Development
Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1985). The Landmark plaintiff obtained
large quantities of defendant's appliances by claiming they would be installed in modular housing destined for Alaska. The plaintiff instead sold the appliances at retail in
California markets where the defendant had established exclusive distributorship. Upon
discovering the scheme, the defendant terminated sales to the plaintiff. Although the
court relied upon a business justification theory, it could also have decided the case on
the ground that the defendant was exercising its GTE Sylvania right to restrict the distribution of its product by territorial exclusivity clauses or customer restraints.
Substituting a GTE Sylvania analysis for the business justification rule, however,
would raise additional questions. A court might face the issue of whether a vertical refusal to deal for purposes other than price fixing ought to be categorized as a per se
illegal boycott. Alternatively, a court might have to decide what factors a plaintiff must
prove to demonstrate that a vertical restraint is unreasonable under the rule of reason.
For discussion of these questions, see infra notes 230-42 and accompanying text.
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Radio Corp.,9 7 a post-Monsanto Supreme Court decision involving allegations of a horizontal conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing,
appears to sanction such an approach. In Matsushita, the plaintiff
charged that manufacturers and sellers of consumer electronics
products in Japan conspired to exclude others from the American
market by raising prices in Japan to subsidize low prices for their
exports to the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint on a summary judgment motion, finding insufficient evidence
of conspiracy to sustain the antitrust claim; the Third Circuit reversed after determining that the trial court had improperly excluded much of the evidence. 98 The Supreme Court relied upon the
neoclassical economic model, which dictates that predatory pricing
is "economically irrational," "practically infeasible," "inherently uncertain," and "speculative," 9 9 and noted that "[t]he alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the two decades of its asserted
operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist." 10 0 The Court remanded the case to the Third Circuit to consider the summary judgment in light of other evidence.' 0 ' The
majority's reasoning threatens to limit significantly the number of
antitrust cases that will go to the jury by encouraging the use of
motions to bring factual issues to the judge before meaningful discovery takes place.
Various factors seem to affect a court's characterization of the
defendant's actions. Cases finding price fixing usually contain evidence that the plaintiff was cutting prices, that the defendant's motive for the termination was the plaintiff's pricing, or that competing
dealers complained about the plaintiff's pricing practices.' 0 2 On the
other hand, sound business justifications or circumstances indicating that the defendant was attempting to exercise GTE Sylvaniasanctioned vertical restraints without the taint of a motive or intent
to fix prices have moved courts to hold that ajury could not classify
the restraint as price fixing, thus allowing the courts to dismiss
03
complaints.
Several courts, following the rule enunciated in Cernuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp., 104 have held that where a supplier cuts off a dis97
98
99

100

101

106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
Id. at 1351-53.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1359.

Id. at 1362.
See cases cited supra notes 63 & 65.
See, e.g., Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43- (D. Mass. 1984); O.S.C. Corp. v.
Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aft'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.
1986); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
aff'd, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985).
104
595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto
102
103
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tributor at a competing distributor's request, the supplier commits a
per se violation of the antitrust laws. The Cernuto rule, however, is
seemingly inconsistent with the "termination plus" requirement of
Monsanto. Courts now seeking to determine whether a supplier that
terminates a price-cutting dealer at the insistence of a competing
dealer is engaged in per se illegal price fixing have encountered difficulties reconciling the two cases.
The Fifth Circuit in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp. 10 5 reached an opposite conclusion from that in Cernuto. In
Business Electronics Corp. the court held it erroneous to instruct a jury
that it could find per se price fixing solely on the basis of facts similar to those in Cernuto. In language indicating that the Fifth Circuit
ascribed unique meaning to "price fixing," the court asserted that
"[a]n agreement to terminate a price cutter does not fix prices at any
specific or general level but merely frees the complaining dealer to
set prices as he chooses."' 10 6 The court then recognized that, under
Monsanto, dealer complaints followed by termination are not sufficient to prove conspiracy and that courts must take care when drawing the line between vertical price fixing and other types of vertical
restraints in determining whether a per se rule should be followed.' 0 7 Ultimately, the court concluded that
in order for a manufacturer's termination of a distributor to be
illegal per se, it must be pursuant to a price maintenance agreement with another distributor. That distributor must expressly or
impliedly agree to set its prices at some level, though not a specific one. The distributor cannot retain complete freedom to set
08
whatever price it chooses.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Business Electronics Corp. badly distorted the Monsanto analysis. The Monsanto Court nowhere required
that a plaintiff prove the existence of a contract between the supplier
and the complaining dealer to maintain prices "at some level" resulting in the price-cutting dealer's termination before allowing a
jury to find illegal price fixing. Concededly, Monsanto does require
proof of a causal connection between an agreement to maintain
prices and the cut-off of a dealer before the dealer can prove antiCorp., 769 F.2d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 1985) ("A conspiracy between a wholesaler and one
or more of its retailers to terminate a competing retailer on the basis of price constitutes
a per se violation of the Sherman Act."); Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd.,
719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
105
780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986).
106
Id. at 1216.
107
The Fifth Circuit's confusing discussion leaves unclear whether the court concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to send the case to a jury on the question of conspiracy or that the evidence would not support a jury finding of price fixing.
Id.
108 Id. at 1218.
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trust injury. 10 9 The Fifth Circuit, however, overstated this
requirement.
The Business Electronics Corp. court's interpretation of Monsanto
likely reflects a belief that vertical price fixing ought not be per se
illegal. Judge Jones explicitly asserted this position in her concurrence. Although Judge Jones has not been appointed to the
Supreme Court or elected to Congress, she apparently felt no constraint in claiming that the case "perfectly illustrates the arguments
why vertical price restraints should be tested under antitrust's Rule
of Reason,""t 0 that the "flaws in Monsanto's continued recognition
of per se illegality are highlighted by this case,""' and that the
"Supreme Court should take the earliest opportunity to review its
' 2
Russian roulette approach to vertical price restraints." "
A more difficult variation of the problem of distinguishing price
fixing activity from protected joint conduct arises where either the
supplier's motive or the effect on price are less direct than in the
case of a discounter terminated pursuant to an agreement with a
competing distributor. For example, is it price fixing for a supplier
to reduce its wholesale price through a "sales assistance" program
in order to help a dealer meet price competition on a specific sale?
Some appellate courts upheld such programs prior to Monsanto, noting that they were essentially procompetitive because they allowed
the dealer to engage in price competition." 3 Similarly, in one postMonsanto case, Bryant Heating & Air Conditioning Corp. v. Carrier
Corp., 14 a district court found that a supplier's sales assistance program did not constitute a price fixing agreement because it did not
"have the effect of depriving the dealer of pricing freedom, but instead sought only to ensure that the discount be passed on to the
customer."115
109
465 U.S. at 767. ("If ...there was evidence of an agreement with one or more
distributors to maintain prices, the remaining question is whether the termination of
Spray-Rite was part of or pursuant to that agreement.").
110 780 F.2d at 1221 (Jones, J., concurring).
III Id.
112
Id. at 1222 (Jones, J., concurring).
113 See Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 F.2d 842, 848 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons,
705 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 919 (1983).
114 597 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Fla. 1984); see also Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg.,
Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1984) (post-Monsanto case stating that sales assistance programs do not necessarily violate the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018
(1984).
115 597 F. Supp. at 1051. The court further supported its conclusion that no price
fixing had occurred by noting that the dealer had initiated the reduction in price, that
the manufacturer had never refused to sell because of the dealer's pricing policies, and
that the manufacturer had never threatened to terminate the dealer over a pricing dispute. Id.
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More controversially, the First Circuit found no price fixing as a
matter of law in Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts." 6 There, the
court scrutinized Blue Shield's full service health insurance program
allowing subscribers to see any doctor who signed a participating
physician's agreement with Blue Shield. Under that contract, the
doctor agreed to accept as payment in full for his services an
amount Blue Shield determined under its formula for ascertaining
customary charges. The plaintiff doctors claimed the plan constituted unlawful price fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Act, as
well as unlawful monopolization and an attempt to monopolize
under section 2 of the Act. 17 The district court accepted the plaintiffs' section 1 claim, finding that the plan unreasonably restrained
competition because the payment method, when coupled with Blue
Shield's size and economic power, 1 8 produced unreasonably rigid
and low prices, interfered with the doctors' freedom to set the price
of their services, and deterred doctors from offering better and
more expensive services. 119
The First Circuit reversed, holding that "from a commercial
perspective, Blue Shield in essence 'buys' medical services for the
account of others"' 120 and that a buyer is entitled to bargain over a
purchase's essential terms; even a monopoly buyer "is entitled to
use its market power to keep prices down."' 12 1 The court thus held
that the conduct did not constitute price fixing, an unreasonable restraint of trade, or a section 2 violation. The court's finding that
Blue Shield was a "buyer" for its third party subscribers played a
crucial role in the decision. The court's analogies to the relationships of a father buying a toy his son picks out, a landlord hiring a
painter to paint his tenant's apartment in accord with the tenant's
specification, or an employer hiring a doctor to treat its employees, 122 however, are somewhat limp. For example, a patient who
buys doctor services normally selects the doctor-seller of the services, while the insurer agrees to pay the bill or reimburse the patient. Moreover, whereas most health care insurance claims involve
just one contract, Blue Shield's plan contained three: the agreement between doctor and patient, the agreement between patient
749 F.2d 922 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 (1985).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act deems guilty of a felony "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt... or combine or conspire with any other person ...to monopolize... trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
118 The district court found that Blue Shield insured 56% of the Massachusetts population (45% under the balance billing plan) and accounted for 74% of the privately
insured population of Massachusetts. 749 F.2d at 924.
119 Id.
Id. at 925.
120
Id. at 929.
121
Id. at 925.
122
116
117
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and insurer, and the agreement between doctor and insurer. Thus,
Kartell raises a serious question as to whether normal assumptions
about the competitive process apply in a market where third party
reimbursement might distort the normal incentives of buyers and
sellers of the service.
Regardless of whether these distinctions merit a different result
from the one reached, the court should have acknowledged them.
Instead, the court simply held:
The relevant antitrust facts are that Blue Shield pays the bill and
seeks to set the amount of the charge. Those facts led other courts
in similar circumstances to treat insurers as if they were 'buyers'.
The same facts convince us that Blue Shield's activities here are
123
like those of a buyer.
From this basic finding, it followed that the prices set by Blue Shield
were not unlawful unless predatory; 124 that as a buyer, Blue Shield
had a right to refuse to deal so long as it acted unilaterally; 1 25 and
that Blue Shield's ban on balance billing was a lawful part of the
12 6
bargain.
Kartell illustrates the significance of the assumptions one makes
about the policy goals underlying antitrust laws. Those who see the
purpose of antitrust as promoting "consumer welfare," as defined
by neoclassical economic analysis, would probably agree with the
Kartell Court's analysis because the Blue Shield plan created lower
prices for consumers. However, the decision will likely trouble
those who view the antitrust laws as securing broader goals such as
guaranteeing the independence of entrepreneurs or preventing private power centers from exercising undue "governmental" power.
Blue Shield's plan interfered with both the pricing discretion of doctors and the freedom of subscribers and took on the trappings of
rate regulation-a power normally exercised by government.
The Kartell court, rather than grappling with the facts in light of
the assumptions underlying the model, ultimately redefined the
facts to fit that model. In the absence of a constructive legislative
response to the market forces' failure to handle the problems of delivering health care services, the court was confronted with a difficult choice between conferring excessive market power on either
insurers or doctors. Confronting the real dimensions of the choice
would reveal that although antitrust policy cannot resolve all market
imperfections, an unrealistically abstract laissez faire approach does
little better.
123
124
125
126

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

926 (emphasis in original).
927-28.
932.
929-30.
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Judge Posner's opinion inJack Walters & Sons v. Morton Building,
Inc. 127 illustrates the significance of both a judge's assumptions
about the policy underlying antitrust laws and the ideology he or
she brings to the process of determining whether conduct should be
legally categorized as price fixing. In that case, a terminated franchisee of prefabricated buildings claimed that its franchiser had illegally imposed a tying arrangement and resale price maintenance
agreement. In a lengthy and dicta-laden opinion, Judge Posner upheld the district court's partial grant of summary judgment for the
defendant. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner found
that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of two separate
products as required to sustain a tying claim. The plaintiff further
argued that the defendant had fixed prices by advertising special
deals on its buildings to consumers and providing sales assistance to
enable its dealers to sell at the advertised price; this claim also failed
to move the court. It held that because the defendant's advertising
program was lawful, steps taken to insure that dealers passed along
wholesale price concessions to consumers did not constitute vertical
price fixing. Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff could not
prove antitrust injury even if it could show a conspiracy to fix prices.
Competing dealers could always harm the plaintiff by selling at
lower prices; the court stated that the plaintiff "will not be heard to
complain about having to meet lawful price competition, which anti128
trust law seeks to encourage."
In his concurring opinion, Judge Swygert justifiably objected to
Judge Posner's extensive dicta. 129 Nevertheless, Judge Posner used
this case to question the validity and continued vitality of the prohibition against vertical maximum price fixing. Although admitting it
was "premature" to "explore this maze further," 130 Judge Posner
wrote that "[i]t is minimum price fixing that creates the analogy to a
dealers' cartel upon which the per se rule against resale price maintenance rests." 13 ' Reasoning that the Supreme Court held maximum price fixing illegal in Albrecht v. Herald Co. 132 because the
exclusive territories in that case were illegal under the rule of United
737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
737 F.2d at 709.
Id. at 713-14. In Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.
1984), an exclusive dealing case,Judge Posner vacated a preliminary injunction by overruling the trial court's finding of irreparable injury and holding that the law of exclusive
dealing required application of a rule of reason rather than the strict test of Standard Oil
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Judge Swygert dissented strongly, claiming that
Judge Posner improperly second-guessed the trial judge and failed to apply the appropriate legal standards. Id. at 396-97 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
130
737 F.2d at 707.
131
Id. at 706.
132
390 U.S. 145 (1968).
127
128
129
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States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 13 3 Judge Posner concluded that the
Court's GTE Sylvania decision overruling Schwinn's per se rule
against vertical territorial restrictions undermined the Albrecht holding.13 4 Judge Posner further concluded that if exclusive territories
are lawful, then a franchiser should be allowed to set maximum
prices for dealers within exclusive territories to prevent franchisee
monopoly pricing.
This dicta-laden analysis ultimately concludes that vertical maximum price fixing agreements are not price fixing within the per se
rule.1 3 5 The conclusion is based on the premises of neoclassical
economic analysis and conflicts with the position of those who maintain that the antitrust laws were designed to promote and ought to
be interpreted as promoting goals broader than those recognized by
Judge Posner's ideology.
The conflict over the goals of antitrust policy becomes even
more apparent in post-Monsanto litigation concerned with the extent
to which vertical restraints unassociated with price fixing ought to
fall within some category of per se analysis. The legal status of boycotts provides an example of this conflict. In a Seventh Circuit case
decided before Monsanto, Products Liability InsuranceAgency v. Crum &
ForsterInsurance Cos., 36 Judge Posner concluded in dicta that a vertically induced refusal to deal is not per se unlawful absent a purpose
to fix prices.13 7 Without intent to fix prices, Judge Posner stated,
"the plaintiff must show that the refusal to deal is likely to reduce
competition."1 3 8 Judge Posner then attacked the plaintiff's claim
that Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 139 established a rule that
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
See Morton Bldg., 737 F.2d at 706-07.
But see Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding vitality in Supreme Court precedents holding maximum price fixing per se illegal).
136
682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding grant of summary judgment for defendant on ground that plaintiff failed to present evidence of conspiracy).
137 Id. at 663. Judge Posner's colleagues on the Fifth Circuit have more openly applied neoclassical economic theories to the issue of concerted refusals to deal, albeit in a
case involving a price fixing claim. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780
F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986); see also supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
138
682 F.2d at 663.
139
359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959) (holding group boycott per se illegal even though "the
victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little
difference to the economy" (footnote omitted)).
In United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), the Supreme Court
held a vertically induced boycott of discount car dealers per se unlawful. The Court
reaffirmed its Klor's opinion:
The principle of these cases is that where businessmen concert their
actions in order to deprive others of access to merchandise which the
latter wish to sell to the public, we need not inquire into the economic
motivation underlying their conduct. Exclusion of traders from the market by means of combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the
free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to be
133

134
135
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injury to any competitor could violate the antitrust laws even if the
action did not reduce competition. Judge Posner questioned the
40
continuing validity of Klor's' protection of individual competitors
and asserted that even if Klor's was still good law, the plaintiff had
failed to show that "his exclusion [from the market] will turn out to
have been the first step in a march toward [the] monopoly"' 14 that
the Klor's Court feared.
The Monsanto Court's implicit recognition that the antitrust
laws seek to protect traders' freedom to sell in accordance with their
own judgment suggests that Klor's is not the relic that Judge Posner's dicta claims. Nor can his claim that a victim must prove that
14 2 of
the boycott is the "first step in a march toward ... monopoly"'
some relevant market withstand scrutiny. Indeed, the Third Circuit
continues to respect Klor's and the goal of protecting the traders'
freedom and has explicitly rejected Judge Posner's view that nonprice vertical boycotts are not per se illegal.
In Malley-Duff & Associates v. Crown Life Insurance Co., 143 an insurance agency showed that the defendant insurance company terminated its contract as the result of a conspiracy between the
defendant's former vice-president and another employee. As part
of the conspiracy, the individual defendants, while in the employ of
the insurance company, secretly set up a front agency for the purpose of taking over the plaintiff's territory. The defendants then
caused the insurance company to extend credit to their front agency
and used their corporate positions to impose unreasonable quotas
on the plaintiff's agency. When the plaintiff failed to meet these
quotas, the individual defendants, as employees of the insurance
company, terminated the plaintiff's agency relationship. They then
transferred the plaintiff's business to their own agency and resigned
from the insurance company to work for their new agency.14 4 Despite these facts, the district court relied on Judge Posner's dicta in
Product'sLiability InsuranceAgency 14 5 to dismiss the complaint, believsaved by reference to the need for preserving the collaborators' profit
margins or their system for distributing automobiles.
Id. at 146 (citations omitted).
682 F.2d at 665.
140
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); see also Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d
367 (3d Cir. 1985) (no antitrust violation for commercial bribery scheme between manufacturer's employee and sales agent because legitimate agency relationship existed and
no sales occurred between the two).
144
734 F.2d at 137-39.
145
Product Liab. Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.
1982); see supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
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ing that no antitrust offense could be established in the absence of
1 46
proof that the conduct adversely affected consumers.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. Judge Aldisert, writing
for the court, concluded that a jury could find that the defendants
and their agency had conspired among themselves and with the insurance company to terminate the plaintiff.' 47 The court then
"part[ed] company" with Judge Posner's Products Liability Insurance
Agency analysis.148 Quoting the Third Circuit decision in Cernuto, Inc.
v. United Cabinet Corp.,' 4 9 the court held that a common supplier's
refusal to deal induced by a competitor of the plaintiff may be horizontal in nature, even though vertical in form.' 50 The court therefore concluded that Judge Posner's characterization of such
restraints as vertical "is not binding and does not foreclose inquiry
as to whether the defendants' alleged agreement may have constituted a perse violation where its principle impact was on the horizontal level."' 5 1 Citing Klor's' 5 2 and United States v. General Motors
Corp., ' 53 the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to ajury finding
54
on the per se theory of horizontal group boycott.'
The "ought" question-what "ought" the goals of antitrust
policy be-lies beneath courts' manipulative categorization of a restraint as horizontal or vertical, their classification of conduct as
within or without a category of per se illegality, and their deductive
application of abstract economic theories. The results in Monsanto
and Malley-Duff & Associates assume that the values stressed by Klor's
are still applicable to antitrust analysis. In contrast, Judge Posner's
neoclassical approach in Products Liability Insurance Agency rejects
these values as inappropriate goals for the federal antitrust laws.
Divisions over the legal definition of per se categories of liability, determinations of whether certain facts fall within a category of
condemned conduct, and what categories of conduct ought to be
condemned on a per se basis will persist until this question of antitrust policy is resolved. A reflective resolution of this question requires consideration of at least the following: (1) the legislative
policies behind the antitrust laws; (2) the role of precedent; (3) the
division of powers between Congress and the courts; (4) the facts
146
147
148

734 F.2d at 140.

142-44.
Id. at 140.
Id. at

149
595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979) (reversing summary judgment for defendant manufacturer who terminated price-cutting distributor at request of competing distributor).
150 734 F.2d at 140-41.
15-1 Id. at 141.
152
359 U.S. 207 (1959); see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
153 384 U.S. 127 (1966); see supra note 139.
154 734 F.2d at 143-44.
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peculiar to disputes brought as antitrust cases; (5) the rights of all
parties to the dispute; (6) the long-range public interest; and (7) the
nature of legal reasoning and its deeper moral responsibilities. The
final section of this Article will expand upon these themes. 155
C.

The Horizontal/Vertical Distinction

Although Monsanto operated as both supplier and retail distributor of herbicides, the Monsanto Court did not address the question of whether Monsanto's conduct constituted a horizontal price
fixing conspiracy. Subsequent cases have ignored this horizontal aspect of the Monsanto decision, although it could be used to narrow
the holding's significance. The Third Circuit's need to characterize
a vertically induced concerted refusal to deal as horizontal in impact
in Malley-Duff& Associates v. Crown Life Insurance Co. 156 may represent
a partial recognition of the increased significance of the horizontal/
vertical distinction in an era of Supreme Court deference to neoclassical economic analysis.
Regents of the University of Californiav. American BroadcastingCompanies' 57 illustrates the horizontal/vertical distinction's significance.
In that case the plaintiffs, members of the Pacific-10 and Big Ten
college football conferences, signed a contract with the Columbia
Broadcasting System to broadcast their football games' 58 after the
Supreme Court struck down the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA's) exclusive bargaining agent status in NCAA v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.' 59 In contrast, the College
Football Association ("CFA"), an association of sixty-three major
college football programs, had signed a contract designating the
American Broadcasting Company ("ABC") "as the exclusive network for member television coverage."' 60 That contract prohibited
CFA members from broadcasting their games on other networks,
even when the game involved a non-CFA member like the Pacific-10
and Big Ten schools. 1 6 ' The plaintiffs claimed that the ABC-CFA
contract restraint amounted to a group boycott and a cartel restricting the output of televised games so as to enhance the value of the
16 2
ABC-CFA contract.
155
156

See infra notes 169-242 and accompanying text.

734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
157 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984).
158 Id. at 513-14.
159 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding NCAA's position as exclusive bargaining agent unreasonable restraint).
160
747 F.2d at 512-13.
1G1 Id.
162
Id. at 516.
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On review of the grant of a preliminary injunction against the
defendants, the court characterized the complaint as one alleging
per se illegal price fixing and a group boycott. The court then distinguished the Supreme Court's application of the rule of reason
standard in NCAA, by noting that, unlike the NCAA, the CFA did
not produce a product in its regulation of competition between
member schools.1 6 3 Instead, the CFA seemed to exist solely for the
purpose of marketing its members' television rights. 164 Accordingly, the Court rejected the defendants' claim that their contract
was essentially a vertical restraint on the distribution of a product
and suggested that the restraint amounted to a horizontal group
boycott, rendering it per se illegal. 165
Once an activity is classified as a horizontal restraint and characterized as price fixing or a group boycott, few would hesitate to
find it illegal per se. The assumptions and logic of a neoclassical
approach to the problem, however, suggest that a court should require that the plaintiffs prove injury to consumers, as well as to
themselves, before condemning the restraint as illegal per se. In
dissent, Judge Beezer seemed to adopt such a stance; he contested
66
the question of whether the restraint was horizontal or vertical
and characterized the dispute as involving competition between network "packages" of games rather than between the televising of particular games. 16 7 Whether all consumers of televised college
football games should be treated alike is subject to doubt, as anyone
familiar with the loyalties of college alumni will attest. The model
nonetheless homogenizes consumers in markets with vertical distributional restraints, in order to protect the model's consistency, reality to the contrary notwithstanding.
The ABC decision may be significant for post-Monsanto litigation
even though the horizontal/vertical discussion is dicta. Many of the
distributor termination cases following Monsanto might be categorized as horizontal restraints because they involve claims of a combination or conspiracy of competing dealers using their common
supplier to cut off or otherwise coerce a competing dealer. 168 If a
Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 516-18.
Id. at 518. Although the court was merely evaluating the defendants' likelihood
of success at trial, it suggested that the ABC-CFA agreement was virtually indistinguishable from that held illegal in NCAA. Id.
166 Id. at 526 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
167 Id.
168 Compare Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985)
(finding sufficient evidence to go to jury on allegation that supplier and prospective
franchisees conspired to fix prices charged to competing present distributors) with National Marine Elec. Distribs. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding no
merit in claim that supplier's termination of plaintiff following competing dealers' com163
164
165
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plaintiff proves such a conspiracy, apart from whether its purpose is
price related, some courts seem willing to classify the restraint as
horizontal. These courts would characterize the conduct as one of
the horizontal per se restraints of price fixing, division of territories
or customers, or a group boycott.
Watching future courts struggle with such abstract classification
problems should prove interesting; the rise or fall of distinctions
like horizontal or vertical, and classifications such as per se or rule
of reason restraints, will undoubtedly inspire plaintiffs to cast their
complaints as horizontal restraints by competing dealers who use
their common supplier to terminate or discipline the plaintiff, or
whatever other form appears most advantageous. Even more interesting will be whether the courts will recognize the problem as
springing from their tendency to rely upon the rigid methodology of
deductive reasoning from a model detached from reality, and their
practice of establishing rigid per se rules to assess a complex reality.
If so, courts may finally begin using inductive reasoning to weigh
the actual facts of the dispute in light of the general values Congress
determined courts should implement in enforcing the antitrust laws.
III
THE "OUGHT"

OF POST-MONSANTO ANTITRUST

REGULATION OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

One cannot complete a tour of the post-Monsanto litigation
without concluding that courts are in substantial conflict over important elements of the antitrust standards to be applied to vertical
market restraints, a conflict which is the product of on-going ideological warfare over the goals of antitrust policy. There is also a lessnoticed problem with the methodology followed in judicial analysis
of antitrust cases generally, regardless of their underlying assumptions about antitrust policy. This problem is the way in which courts
and commentators approach fact analysis in antitrust disputes and
the antitrust laws' general policy, as opposed to the preconceived
substantive rules they bring to the process. Courts and commentators have come to rely upon fixed rules, rigid economic and legal
concepts, a mechanical deductive logic, and cliches. In the process,
they sacrifice a creative and inductive analysis of the dispute's actual
facts in light of the law's underlying policy goals and values, the insights available from other disciplines, institutional constraints upon
the courts, and concern for the long term consequences of a particular decision. As a result, courts and commentators determine the
plaints reflected horizontal agreement to fix prices). See also Marco Holding Co. v. Lear
Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (denying summary judgment on allegation that supplier terminated dealer to placate complaining dealers).
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"is" of the dispute without reference to its underlying facts; furthermore, they arrive at an "ought" that is dictated solely by the assumptions and methodology they follow in applying predetermined
rules to predefined facts, never examining the antitrust laws' relevance, meaning, and application as envisioned by Congress. As a
long term consequence of such a process, antitrust policy will become a wooden and irrelevant system of law, incapable of implementing the policies that Congress intended it to fulfill.
A.

Defects In The Current Analytical Methodology For
Judging The "Ought" Of Vertical Restraints

In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.16 9 the United States
Supreme Court struck down vertical territorial and customer restrictions where title to the goods has passed from a supplier to a distributor. The majority based its decision on the assumption that such
restraints were "obviously destructive of competition,"170 reasoning
that the common-law rule against restraints on alienation forbade
the imposition of controls over the use or subsequent distribution of
property once title had passed to a buyer. 171 Justices Stewart and
Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, attacked the majority's method of reasoning; they accused the majority of relying
upon the rigid application of an "'ancient rule' "172 derived during
the "reign of Queen Elizabeth I'173 without taking account of modem reality, stating that:
[T]he state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon
vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today.
The problems involved are difficult and complex, and our response should be more reasoned and sensitive than the simple
acceptance of a hoary formula .... [T]he Court's answer makes
everything turn on whether the arrangement between a manufacturer and his distributor is denominated a "sale" or "agency."
Such a rule ignores and conceals the "economic and business stuff
out of which" a sound answer should be fashioned.' 74
The majority's reliance upon a "wooden application of the
venerable rule against restraints on alienation"' 175 was widely and
169

388 U.S. 365 (1967).

170
171
172
173

Id. at 379.

Id. at 380.
Id. at 393 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 393 (quoting Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945,
983 (1928)).
174 Id. at 392-93 (footnote omitted) (quoting White Motor Co.v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
175
Flynn, The Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules In Vertical Market Restraints, 58
WASH. U.L.Q. 767, 769 (1980).
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rightly criticized as "an exercise in barren formalism."' 7 6 The decision ignored the complexities of modem mass marketing, the interests of all of the parties to the restraint, and the insights of economic
analysis applied to legal problems. On a more basic, jurisprudential
level, the Schwinn Court's method of analysis was inconsistent with a
legitimate and sophisticated legal analysis of the "is" and the
"ought" of the dispute. The Schwinn Court should have used a creative analysis of all of the facts in light of the many broad values underlying antitrust policy and the rich sources of wisdom (including
but not limited to the potential insights of economics and the purposes underlying common law property rules) to pour contemporary meaning into those values. Instead, the Schwinn Court's
method of reasoning constituted an epistemological decapitation of
the fact-finding process and bound its analysis with an intellectual
straitjacket which prevented exploration of a multitude of disciplines for insights into the contemporary meaning and application
77
of the antitrust policies.1
Advocates of the exclusive use of neoclassical economic analysis
as the one true path for determining what the antitrust rules ought
to be and how they ought to apply in specific antitrust disputes criticized Schwinn with particular vigor.17 In essence, these critics complained that the Court ignored the teachings of the hypotheses of
"economic analysis," the deductively derived rules dictated by the
artificial assumptions and hidden value choices of neoclassical economic analysis. "Economic analysis," according to its proponents,
would demonstrate that all purely vertical restraints should be analyzed under the "rule of reason" or should be presumed per se
1 79
lawful.
The basis of the economic analysis argument is easily explained. Pursuant to the model's definitions and underlying value
176
Baker, Vertical Restraints in Tinzes of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44
ANTITRUST LJ.537, 537 (1975). The leading articles criticizing Schwinn are collected in
L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN, & H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION:
ANTITRUST 637 n.99 (6th ed. 1983).
177 The best summary of those values may be found in Fox, supra note 23, at 1146-

55.
178

See Bork, supra note 27, at 172 ("Schwinn's result was not only wrong, but its

rationale verged on mere wittiness."); Posner, The Nxt Step In The Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1981) (same); Posner, Antitrust
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and
Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975) (same) [hereinafter cited as
Antitrust Policy]. In some instances, the criticism bordered on ridicule. See, e.g., Bork,
supra note 27, at 179 (Schwinn opinion "inspired criticism bordering on ribaldry").
179 See, e.g., Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One
Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457 (1981) (advocating rule of reason
analysis); Posner, The Net Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981) (advocating per se legality).
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choices, one assumes that the market is perfectly competitive, that a
supplier's motive for imposing a vertical restraint is to maximize
output, that complex organizations behave in accord with the
model's definitions, and that the aggregate of the micro will reflect
the macro common good. 180 Accordingly, courts should consider
the proponent of the restraint's judgment as a surrogate for the
legal system's responsibility to determine whether the restraint violates the Sherman Act.18 1 In other words, neoclassicists would have
courts adopt a wooden and inflexible rule of per se legality premised upon definitions and values extant in the time of King George
III, rather than rely like the Schwinn Court upon the rigid application
of the common law concepts of restraints upon alienation derived
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I.
Substituting one set of rigid and artificial rules for another con82
tinues the process of short-circuiting the legal process's function.'
The model distorts the "is" of disputes to obtain the necessary con180
Elsewhere, I have dissected the underlying assumptions of neoclassical economic
analysis, including, among others, the concepts of rationality, supply, demand, and marginal cost. See Flynn, Appendix: Definitions and Assumptions of Economic Analysis, 12 Sw. U.L.
REv. 361 (1981); see also Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw.
U.L. REV. 335 (1981) (criticizing simplified assumptions of economic analysis) [hereinafter cited as Misuse].
Advocates of economic analysis use definitions rather than assumptions founded
upon empirical observation, and they ignore the insights of psychologists, sociologists,
or others having some experience with reality. See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974). Moreover, economic analysis ignores time, causation, and the existence of a legal system defining pre-existing rights
based on a pre-existing distribution of entitlements. One of course needs to control the
number of variables in constructing a hypothesis, lest it become too complex to be manageable. However, there must be a limit to simplification if the model is to have any
potential relevance to reality. The compulsion to be a "science" may overwhelm common sense in some areas of human inquiry, preventing the "scientist" from understanding that a particular area of human inquiry requires performance on the higher level of
the artist.
181
See Bork, supra note 27, at 180-82 (vertical restraints are proconsumer and should
be lawful); Antitrust Policy, supra note 178, at 298-99 (government must demonstrate supplier's bad motive for vertical restraint).
182 The economic analysis methodology resembles the Court's approach during the
era of "substantive due process," when the Court used the undefined concept of due
process to implement unstated normative objectives. In the last days of the judiciary's
assertion of power to determine economic policy, proponents of this form of simplistic
rule application stated their analytical methodology in a single sentence:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). Advocates of exclusively using neoclassical economics as the guide to antitrust policy appear to claim courts should follow a
substantive due process type of methodology in antitrust litigation. Their basic maxim
seems to be that when an activity is challenged in the courts as not conforming to the
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formity of the facts to its unverified assumptions and definitions.
Thus, the "scientific" model unknowingly sacrifices the process for
determining the "ought" of the decision. Not surprisingly, exclusive reliance upon this form of rigid rule application to analyze legal
disputes is coming under increasing criticism, some of which verges
18 3
on outright ridicule.
The law and economics approach of neoclassical economics advocates patterns its methodology after an outmoded notion of "scientific" analysis which examines reality with fixed assumptions
defining that reality.' 8 4 Based upon a series of unrealistic assumpmodel of neoclassical economic theory, the judicial branch has only one duty-to lay the
model beside the practice and "to decide whether the latter squares with the former."
For an application of a fixed ideological model to the woei of the Supreme Court,
see Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Supreme Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984). The Easterbrook reincarnation of the Butler
methodology of legal reasoning is criticized in Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus: EqualJustice
or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985) (utilitarian approach ignores distribution of wealth and power and underlying definitions of social values and perspectives).
Judge Easterbrook responded to Tribe's criticism in Easterbrook, Method, Result, andAuthority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985), asserting the moral value ofjudges' applying neoclassical economic analysis while claiming that judges ought not impose their
own moral views when deciding cases. Ajudge unaware of and incapable of questioning
his or her own moral values poses serious risks to the realistic, fair, and effective functioning of the legal process. See Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). In effect, Judge Easterbrook advocates judges'
assuming the role of philosopher kings while claiming to eschew such a role.
183 See, e.g., Flynn, Misuse, supra note 180, at 346 ("To make a fixed deductive model
the premise of an inductive legal system is to jam a square peg into a round hole. The
deductive square peg of this kind of economic analysis mutilates the inductive round
hole of the legal process .... ); Horowitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 905 (1980) ("Future legal historians will need to exercise their imaginations to figure out why so many people could have taken [economic analysis] so
seriously."). For a particularly harsh criticism of antitrust's exclusive reliance upon neoclassical economic analysis, see Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusion of Models: The
FaustianPact of Law and Economics, 72 CEO. L.J. 1511 (1984).
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars, sensitive to the complexities of establishing
the meaning of legal concepts, launch particularly harsh criticisms at the law and economics movement. See Heller, The Importanceof Normative Decision-Making: The Limitations
of Legal Economics as a Basisfor a LiberalJurisprudence-AsIllustratedby the Regulation of Vacalion Home Development, 1976 Wis.L. REV. 385; Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L.
REV. 769; Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought. Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 939 (1985); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). For a thoughtful rejoinder to
CLS, see Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349 (1984).
184 As Nobel Prize winner Wassily Leontief observed in an interview, this notion
posits that scientific inquiry proceeds from theory to verification by observation, rather
than from observation to theory with a never-ending interaction between the two (as in
legal analysis):
Q. But don't the mathematical physicists like, say, Einstein, start out
with a formula first and then try to demonstrate it or prove it in the
universe?
A. But Einstein knew what the concepts meant; they were not given....
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tions, the neoclassical law and economics school. derives definitions
to create an abstract and static model.' 8 5 It then uses that model to
make predictions about the real world and to determine the Cis"
and the "ought" for resolving legal disputes under antitrust policies
defined by Congress.186

Many leaders of the neoclassical movement claim that one
should not compare reality with the model's assumptions, but
should compare the model's implications with the facts observed in
light of the model.' 8 7 Apart from the questionable assertion that an
allegedly empirically based model can be created out of the thin air
of ideologically based definitions, the model itself dictates which
facts and which values are relevant to an evaluation of its own impliQ. So then you think a lot of our [economists] empirical work has gone
way beyond the quality and extent of our data base?
A. Exactly, economics is getting too far removed from observation. Observation must be the origin of the idea. Then there must be an interplay
between observation and theory.... Observation by itself is the beginning of any science. At the outset you can only point out the object of
your curiosity with your finger, because once you use words to describe it
you are already beginning to theorize. Then you translate it into theoretical terms ....
You translate the theoretical results into factual statements, and you move forward by shuttling back and forth. That process
is what propels you forward in developing a science.
Leontief, Why Economics Needs Input-Output Analysis (Interview), CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr.
1985, at 27, 29, 30; see also infra notes 217 & 227.
185 This abstract and static model is one of perfect competition. "Perfect competition" has been described as follows:
"Perfect" competition, in the terminology which seems to me most
useful, means an absolutely "frictionless" world. Everybody knows
everything, everyone can be everywhere at once, coal heavers can become
brain surgeons, and brain surgeons coal heavers, overnight. The capital
embodied in a university can transfer itself instantaneously into a battleship and so on. Obviously such a set of requirements defines an impossibility; yet nothing less would give us the automatically functioning market
some people are looking for.
Wright, Some Pitfalls of Economic Theory as a Guide to the Law of Competition, 37 VA. L. REV.
1083, 1085-86 (1951).
186 For an application of such an approach across the board which ignores the goals
for antitrust policy defined by Congress, see Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to
the CartelizationStandard, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1985).
187 See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3 (1966). The model's assumptions determine what is "fact." Thus, facts
always conform to the model's assumptions, because reality not in conformity with the
model is not considered "reality." Professor Mason has criticized such an approach,
observing:
Deception occurs because the pure theories of this framework are
consistently misapplied in the interpretation of concrete reality ...
[A]ccordingly, so-called empiricists have sought to verify their own hypotheses and to demolish contrary views by selection and manipulation
of data that cannot accomplish either purpose. Such performances have
been characterized as, "blatantly ascientific"

. . .

and an "abandonment

of empirical science for a numerology similar to astrology."
Mason, Some Negative Thoughts on Friedman'sPositive Economics, 3 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON.
235, 244 (1980-81).
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cations. Testing the validity of the model's implications thus becomes a tautological exercise. 188
The neoclassical economists' reliance upon a rigid form of deductive logic in applying their model aids and abets this anti-empirical and anti-intellectual consequence. 189 With its rigid use of
deductive logic, the model becomes an analytical meat cleaver which
ignores noneconomic assumptions and fails to draw noneconomic
inferences. The result: a form of "tunnel vision,"' 9 0 intolerant of
any questioning of its assumptions or tampering with its predictions
through observation of facts other than those defined by the model.
The pattern of post-Monsanto gyrations by advocates of an exclusively neoclassical approach to vertical market restraints demonstrates the model's inability to explain factual situations that go
beyond the model's prescribed ontology. The model dictates that
the only valid reason for a supplier to impose a restraint (other than
as part of a horizontal dealer or supplier cartel) is to maximize production or distributional efficiencies to the great benefit of consumers. 19 ' The model assumes that suppliers imposing such restraints
188
For example, the model defines "rational" choice without regard to the wisdom
or social acceptability of the choice. Defining "rational" as whatever someone chooses
renders the concept virtually meaningless and can mislead the unsophisticated into believing that the model defines "rational" in its broader sense. The late Arthur Leff,
commenting on Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, made the following observations about this type of circular reasoning:
Thus what people do is good, and its goodness can be determined by
looking at what it is they do. In place of the more arbitrary normative
"goods" of Formalism, and in place of the more complicated empirical
"goods" of Realism, stands the simple definitionally circular "value" of
Posner's book. If human desire itself becomes normative (in the sense
that it cannot be criticized), and if human desire is made definitionally
identical with certain human acts, then those human acts are also beyond
criticism in normative or efficiency terms; everyone is doing as best he
can exactly what he set out to do which, by definition, is "good" for him.
In those terms it is not at all surprising that economic analyses have "considerable power in predicting how people in fact behave."
Leff, supra note 180, at 458 (quoting R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 5 (1973));
see also id. at 458 n.21 ("That is often the problem with heuristically simplified models;
when you think you are describing a curve, you are really describing the graph paper.").
189 Instead, more informal logic should be the tool for testing the assumptions underlying the relevant rules. Ideally, logic in legal reasoning uses induction and analogy
to examine the meaning and relevance of facts as well as the assumptions underlying
rules in light of many factors: history, experience, cultural mores, common sense,
changing values, and the insights of such disciplines as sociology, psychology, and economics. See Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE Lj. 201 (1931).
190 Leff, supra note 180, at 452.
191 See, e.g., Antitrust Policy, supra note 178, at 283-85 (restraints serve to increase
point-of-sale services to consumer). Professional economists consider the problem far
more complicated than the simplistic analysis one usually encounters in the law reviews
would suggest. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 177 (1985);
cf. Acheson, The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy, 1J.L. ECON. &ORGANIZATION 385 (1985)(highly fragmented industry not obeying classical model). See Phillips,
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are incapable of raising prices above a certain level because of competition 9 2 from similar or fungible products, or the threat of new
entries to the market. Consequently, a supplier imposing such restraints is acting in its own self-interest, and will only do so if the
restraint enhances efficiency under conditions of perfect competi1 93
tion and profit maximization.
The exercise of vertical restraints often increases prices to consumers by curbing or abolishing intrabrand competition. 94 The
model must therefore provide some justification to consumers and
distributors for the legal system's allowing such activity. Hence,
neoclassical economists created the concept of the "free rider,"1 9 5
Schwinn Rules and the "New Economics" of Vertical Relations, 44 ANTrruST LJ.573 (1975)
("The motives for vertical integration are treated superficially in orthodox theory.") ;
Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST LJ. 687 (1983) ("The theory is
at something like the state of celestial mechanics at the time of Ptolemy... i.e., everything revolved around the earth ....Law is some distance behind. It is more or less at
the state where the stars are on fixed poles relative to the earth."); Steiner, The Nature of
Vertical Restraints, 30 ANrrrRUsT BULL. 143, 171-87 (1985) (describing several scenarios
in which vertical restraints are common yet socially inefficient).
192
There are, of course, several concepts of "competition," suggesting the need for
great care when using the term to draw the line between legality and illegality. As one
commentator has written:
Competition is different things to different men and many things to all
men .... It may be free, pure, perfect, open, imperfect, atomistic, vicious, destructive, cut-throat, monopolistic, oligopolistic, workable, effective, capitalistic, socialistic, Darwinian. A large variety of meanings for a
term, when a precise meaning is difficult or impossible to distinguish
clearly from the context, may make seemingly clear statements deceptive
or meaningless....
The elusive and changing character of the term, competition, becomes more than just semantics when that which is illegal is defined in
terms of competition.
Bernhard, Competition in Law and in Economics, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1099, 1100 (1967).
The same may be said for the concept of "efficiency." "Efficiency" may be, and is,
used in several different senses: productive efficiency, allocative efficiency, innovative
efficiency, etc. More often than not, the neoclassical economic model uses the tautological sense of defining whatever outcome the model predicts as "efficient." This use once
again misleads the unsophisticated into believing that following the model produces efficiency and that rejecting the model (or considering other factors) produces an inefficient
result. See Peritz, supra note 22, at 1281-92 (defining and criticizing Posner's various
uses of "efficiency").
193
Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdomfor
Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214, 1215 (1977) (restating and criticizing neoclassical
model).
194
Even where the conduct does not lead to higher prices, it may still violate the
antitrust laws by infringing upon other congressional goals for antitrust enforcement.
See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (viewing maximum price fixing as interference with traders' freedom to set prices, displacement of competitive market pricing, and assumption
of governmental powers by private combination); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968) (same).
195 The "free rider" concept originated in Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair
Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86, 91 (1960). For a review of the evolution of the "free rider"
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the notion that suppliers must be free to shelter distributors performing demonstration, repair, warranty, or other services from
competition by distributors not performing such services and therefore able to sell the product at a lower price. The label suggests that
the "free rider" gets something (a competitive advantage) for nothing, and does so at the expense of an honest supplier and its dealers
who are slavishly devoted to the public interest.1 9 6 Admitting that
the "free rider" may be engaged in the very competition the antitrust laws were designed to foster' 9 7 would call into question the
model's coherence and reliance upon the supplier's self-interested
choice to impose his or her will on dealers (or vice versa). It would
also call into question the suitability of the model's legal enforcement as a surrogate for independent determination of the permissible scope of vertical restraints.
For example, the use of resale price maintenance in the distribution of products where the provision of customer services is nonexistent1 98 spurred the model's true believers to provide a broader
rationale. The explanation needed to be consistent with both the
model's assumptions and the laissez faire ideology which fuels it.
Professor Victor Goldberg advanced one such hypothesis: manufacturers impose vertical restrictions to obtain the "provision of services by retailers to manufacturers" as well as consumers where a "free
rider" threat exists.1 9 9 The manufacturer "services" Goldberg hypothesizes as justifying vertical restraints include the rental of "shelf
space," 20 0 the buying of "endorsement" services by association with
theory, see Popofsky & Bomse, From Sylvania to Monsanto: No Longer a "Free Ride," 30
BULL. 67, 87 (1985); see also Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of
Reason, 53 ANTrrRusT L.J. 135 (1984) (carrying theory to its potentially libertarian extreme by urging legality of all vertical restrictions); Scherer, supra note 191, at 694-97
(questioning "free rider" phenomenon).
ANTITRUST

196

"Free riders" are assumed to be a potential evil justifying every vertical
restraint. The ill-defined concept of "free rider" apparently is attached to
buyers or competitors not abiding by any goal a seller seeks to achieve by
a vertical restraint. The neoclassical theology condemns "free riders" as a
plague and denounces their rights and rationalities as beyond notice by
the law.
Flynn, "Reaganomics" andAntitrustEnforcement: A jurisprudentialCritique, 1983 UTAH L. REV.
269, 290.
197 See Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Casefor a Per Se Rule Against
Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. LJ. 1487, 1493 (1983) ("Until the recent ideology about
'free riders' became fashionable, they were regarded as the very heart of a free market
competitive system.").
198 See Pitofsky, Why "Dr. Miles" Was Right, 8 REG. 27, 29 (1984); Scherer, supra note
191, at 694; Steiner, supra note 191, at 156-60.
199 See Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing,and the Economics of Retailing
Services, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 736, 737 (1984).
200

Id. at 738-44.
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the distributor's reputation, 20 1 and the "bonding" of a distributor
by "paying" the distributor a high return on present sales. 20 2
Although much of Goldberg's hypothesis remains speculative, 20 3 it is an imaginative attempt to square recalcitrant reality with
the model's dictates. Some may object that the hypothesis would
result in higher prices to consumers forced to pay for the "service"
'20 4
of shelf space rental, "endorsement" services, or "bonding.
Id. at 744-48.
Id. at 749.
Professor Goldberg's article is laden with "can", "might", "could" and hypotheticals introduced by these modifiers. Although speculation of this sort can be a
useful way to challenge existing assumptions, it is highly misleading when used for the
opposite purpose-that is, to confirm assumptions rather than question their predicates.
The perspective adopted here provides a rich array of plausible rationales for adopting vertical restrictions. Indeed, this article concludes that
we have almost an embarrassment of riches; there are too many explanations. That does not mean that we will be incapable of distinguishing
among alternative explanations. It simply means that we cannot get away
with flip answers to hard questions.
Goldberg, supra note 199, at 738 (citations omitted).
The fact that these rationales may be plausible does not mean that they are in fact
true, or that the legal system ought to recognize them, or that they provide a less "flip
answer" to "hard questions" than those answers found by relying upon the model. Generalizing from a specific hypothetical, particularly where one's understanding of the hypothetical is dictated by an abstract model premised upon artificial assumptions, does
little to advance the law's understanding of reality. Basing the rules of the legal control
of vertical restraints upon such speculation detaches the analysis of specific disputes
even further from reality and confines the analysis of what the law ought to be to the
narrow range of values underlying the speculation.
Professor Goldberg's remarks at the 1986 meeting of the Antitrust Law and Economics Section of the AALS proceeded on the assumption that markets are perfectly
competitive and that Congress adopted that model as the sole guide for the courts to use
in defining the scope of antitrust policy. Goldberg, The Vertical Restraints Guidelines of
the DOJ: An Appreciation, Remarks before the Antitrust Law and Economics Section of
the American Association of Law Schools (Jan. 5, 1986) (on file at Cornell Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Goldberg's Remarks]. The former is unrealistic; the latter has been
discredited by both the careful scholarship of objective scholars, see Fox, supra note 23;
H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTrIRusT POLICY (1955), and Congress's continued expressions of disapproval of the Reagan administration's antitrust enforcement policy in the
area of vertical restraints, see infra note 242.
During the debate following his remarks, Goldberg misstated my criticism as one
seeking increased "job security for dealers." Antitrust and EconomicRegulation and Comparative Law Sections Joint Program (cassette tape of proceedings available from Recorded
Resources Corp., Crofton, Md.). As should be obvious from this article, my criticism is a
much broader and deeper jurisprudential one. Moreover, my criticism does not favor
'job security for dealers," although the Goldberg hypothesis may be characterized as
"welfare for suppliers" in that it unquestioningly protects their absolute property and
contract rights while ignoring the rights of others affected by the restraint.
204
See Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust
Policy, 98 HARv. L. REV. 983, 990-92 (1985) (consumers not homogenous in need of
same services).
In many instances, vertical restraints result in higher prices for all consumers in
order to cover the cost of services a supplier or its distributors believe some consumers
need. Professor Goldberg bluntly justifies his shelf space/endorsement/bonding thesis
201

202
203
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Such complaints, however, would probably issue from those not embracing the assumption that a supplier freely exercising its property
and contract rights also acts in the best interests of the otherwise
20 5
uninformed consumer coerced by the restraint.
An unenlightened consumer or distributor may not appreciate
the benefit being conferred upon him or her because the model assumes that only the supplier's legally protected property and contract
rights matter. The model's use of a fixed assumption about rights
and rationalities to define distributors' and consumers' rights in antitrust litigation is never explicitly acknowledged. The situation is
analogous to the assumptions relied upon to justify the "fair trade"
movement which was designed to freeze the status quo of distribution practices in order to protect existing distributors' rights from
the methods, such as catalog and discount sales, employed by distributors whose rights were ignored.2 0 6 Perhaps such reasoning is
based upon a variant of the "trickle down" theory in that it argues
that by protecting and enhancing the "haves' " power and wealth,
benefits will "trickle down" to the "have nots."
The model, despite its superficial libertarian appeal, presupposes the existence of a legal system and a set of property and contract rights belonging to the proponent of a restraint. This legal
system, according to the model, ought to protect these rights without concern for the property and contract rights of others affected
by the restraint. 20 7 Thus, the model presents "half-a-loaf" libertariin the name of retailer services to manufacturers, Goldberg's Remarks, supra note 203, at
7, or, to coin a slogan, "manufacturer welfare." He assumes, of course, that the manufacturer is subject to perfect competition and therefore maximizes both consumer and
manufacturer welfare. The "rich array of plausible rationales for adopting vertical restrictions," Goldberg, supra note 199, at 738, does not account for the possibility of
imperfections in either competition or some of the assumptions underlying the model
(i.e., perfect information, consumers can be everywhere at once, all parties are bargaining freely). Because he does not recognize the possibility of such imperfections, Professor Goldberg sees no reason why the rational supplier might be tempted to impose
vertical restraints for monopolistic purposes, rather than on behalf of consumer welfare.
Embracing such an imperfect reality would disrupt the frictionless functioning of the
model, destroy its internal coherence, and threaten the underlying ideology the model
serves.
205 The text focuses on the scenario of the supplier-imposed restraint on dealers for
convenience, and because that is the most common pattern in antitrust litigation. However, powerful distributors may impose vertical restraints on unwilling suppliers. Cf.
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984) (insurance company
imposed price schedule upon physicians supplying services to insured patients), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 (1985).
206
The history of the "fair trade" movement is summarized in L. ScHwARTZ, J.
FLYNN, & H. FIRST, supra note 176, at 590-98.
207
The common law tradition recognizes both property and contract rights as creations of society. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) ("In
the world of nature apart from more or less organized society, there are things but
clearly no property rights."); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909) (contract
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anism; it objects to government interference with the market except
to enforce the property and contract rights and rationality of those
imposing the restraint. The model then uses the right to legally enforce one side's "rationality" to define what the legal system's rules
ought to be concerning the scope of property and other rights of
suppliers, distributors, and consumers. One commentator pointedly observed:
[M]ost current law and economics theory represents neo-conceptualism strikingly similar to the classical conceptualism successfully undermined by the realists. The law and economics model is
the model of free, value-enhancing exchange, yet.. .market exchanges are in fact a function of the legal order; the terms of socalled free bargains (and, taken collectively, the supposedly objective market price) are determined by the legally protected right to
withhold what is owned. Exchange "value" (and "costs") is a
function of that right, so that the rationale of exchange is ultimately as circular and self-referencing as the rationale for legal
rights.The legitimacy of every exchange calculus depends upon
the legitimacy of prior legal decisions; it neither establishes that
legitimacy nor evades the problem of legitimacy by a purported
ahistorical objectivity. Similarly, judges cannot escape responsibility for the distributional consequences of legal decisions. The
exchange calculus cannot be divorced from the question of distribution, since exchange is a function of the existing distribution of
legal entitlement, and every new legal decision (including those
that rigorously apply the law and economics approach) will inevitably affect subsequent distribution and, in turn, affect subsequent
exchanges, costs, values, etc. Like the older spheres of private
and public, questions of market exchange and of distribution simply collapse into each other. 20 8
rights created by society). Although it does not explicitly state that property and con-

tract rights are inherent in individuals, the neoclassical paradigm appears to proceed
from such a premise. If so, the assumption is contrary to basic legal and normative
assumptions about the nature of such rights in our society and is contrary to the traditional view that the antitrust laws are a limitation upon the exercise of such rights by the
sovereign creating them.
The paradigm thus asserts a radical set of normative values premised on an absolutist view of property and contract rights held by one class of society against the rest. As
a consequence, the model provides the means for an absolute defense of the status quo
that is antithetical to the goals of antitrust policy and the moral objectives of classical
economic theorists who argued for regulating society's economic affairs through the
maintenance of competition.
208
E. Mensch, The Histoiy of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE

18, 37 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). In a similar vein, Professor Samuels

has observed:
Regulation involves choices between alternative rules of the game and
between alternative assignments of rights that are logically prior to economic analysis. Economics can no more tell us what rules and rights
structures should be than what technology and tastes should exist. Thus,
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Although seldom clearly articulated, the model assumes that a
supplier's property rights and the rights of a dealer seeking to impose the restraint are absolute. The model both adopts a libertarian
conception of property and assumes that vertical relationships are
the product of freely-bargained contracts, thus presenting an uneasy
marriage of a nineteenth-century view of contracts and an eighteenth-century view of reality.
Legal theorists, however, have long considered property rights
negative rights, that is, community-defined rights to invoke the
state's aid to exclude others from the use or possession of something of value.2 0 9 Antitrust's prohibition on contracts in restraint of
trade is part of the community's definition of the scope of one's enforceable property and contract rights. In vertical restraint cases, society calls upon courts to sort out conflicting rights between buyer,
seller, and community in light of the antitrust laws' goals. For example, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 2 10 the Court re-

fused to enforce Doctor Miles's property rights in its patent
medicines in a way restricting a subsequent owner's property right
to alienate the property at a price of its choosing. The Court's action proceeded from the assumption that the creation and enforcement of property rights are central functions of a society's legal
system.2 1 1 The Court weighed the scope of one's right to call upon
the legal system to enforce the community-created right in light of
the distributor's and the public's property and contract rights.
Similarly, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,2 1 2 a nineteenth-century case examining the common law attitude toward
for the economist to assert the substance of "optimal" regulation, or the
regulatory policy that will result in the optimal level or direction of control ... is to assert covertly the rules and rights structures and to reach
beyond economic analysis to antecedent normative premises as to whose
interests should count....
... With no unique optimal use of resources and opportunities independent of rights identification and assignment, the legal system must
select the result to be pursued: the definition of the efficient solution is both the
object and the subject of the legal system. It is ironic that much conventional
analysis assumes fully defined rights and a principle mandating compensation ....
...Too often, policy conclusions are tautological, with implicit normative premises that assume something about the object to be determined which prefigures the determination-typically, of whose interest is
to count.
Samuels, Normative Premises in Regulatory Theory, 1J. PosT KEYNESIAN ECON. 100, 105-06,
111 (1978) (emphasis in original).
209 See Cohen, supra note 207. For a historical examination of the nature of contract
rights, see Pound, supra note 207.
210 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
211 Id. at 406-09 (discussing public interests at stake in litigation).
212 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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contracts in restraint of trade, proceeded from the assumption that
even freely bargained contract rights are creatures of the legal system which creates them for reasons beyond the mere advancement
of the rationality of one party to the "bargain." Defining the scope
of enforceable contract rights necessarily involves the rationality
2 13
and interests of both parties and the public.
The antitrust laws constitute a community-imposed limitation
on the right to contract, a limitation which transcends the bare assumption that the right to contract is absolute on one side of the
bargain, that in the real world parties of equal power in a perfectly
competitive market freely bargain, or that one may ignore the rights
of other parties to the contract and the public in general. Among
the factors to be considered in fixing one's contract rights are the
impact of the exercise of those rights upon the other party to the
contract and the community, defined by reference to the congressional purposes of the antitrust laws and to the courts' experience in
enforcing those purposes in actual disputes.
An analytical model that precludes a court from balancing these
interests, such as the model employed in Schwinn 21 4 or that proposed by advocates of the exclusive use of neoclassical economics to
decide such disputes, is fundamentally at odds with the analytical
methodology of the legal process. The legal process's most basic
purpose is to resolve disputes in accord with their facts, in light of
the normative values underlying society's laws. To achieve its purpose, the legal process must avoid locking itself into an unrealistic
view of reality and a doctrinaire ideology detached from the law's
normative objectives.
Unsurprisingly, the neoclassical economic model has been described as "blatantly ascientific" and an abandonment of "empirical
science for a numerology similar to astrology." 2 15 Nor is it any wonder that many leading professional economists have come to despair
the "poverty" of their discipline 21 6 as it is consumed by an ever
more arcane pursuit to defend the model's internal coherence and
ideology in light of a reality that stubbornly refuses to validate the
2 17
model's assumptions.
213
214

Id. at 280.

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); seesupra notes 16977 and accompanying text.
215
Mason, supra note 187, at 244.
216, See Kuttner, The Poverly of Economics, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1985, at 74.
217
See Leontief, supra note 184. Professor Leontief observed:
I really had some magnificent ideas from those [eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century] economists to develop my approach. But other
economists who inherited those ideas continued to theorize instead of
collecting more facts. When they ran out of facts, they began to make
assumptions. This is where modern academic economics began to go
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Unthinking application of the model may also transgress the
constitutional right to a jury trial on contested issues of fact 21 8 and
the underlying separation of governmental powers. Although
courts possess wide discretion in interpreting broadly worded statutes like the Sherman Act, that discretion is not unlimited. Since
the end of the reign of economic substantive due process, courts
2 19
have recognized Congress's power to determine economic policy.
Now, as during the time of economic substantive due process, the
failure to acknowledge the appropriate division of lawmaking powers between the courts and Congress threatens to sacrifice the judiciary's policy-making function in areas where that function is
220
appropriate.
The Congresses that adopted the antitrust laws did not envision
the enshrinement of the abstract and unrealistic neoclassical concept of efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust policy. Indeed, Professor Fox has pointed out that the primary opponents of the Sherman
Act were those who subscribed to the neoclassical concept of efficiency. 2 2 1 The majority of the legislators, however, had in mind four
wrong. In the 1930's ... I suggested that the way to build a quantitative
theory is to observe reality, and to define certain concepts .... Your concepts first need some empirical meaning and content ....

Academic

economists in our day have generally not been subject to the harsh discipline of systematic fact-finding. Our colleagues in the natural sciences
have always had to find data, to generate data from observations. Since
economists can't run controlled experiments, they developed an irresistible predilection for deductive reasoning. In fact, many of our economists
entered the discipline after specializing in pure or applied mathematics.... Typically, such economists first developed a theory, then wrote it
as a formula, and then proceeded with defining its terms in such a way as
to make it true.
Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
218 The extensive and widespread use of summary judgment to terminate vertical
restraint cases, usually on the ground of insufficient evidence to prove a contract, conspiracy, or price-fixing conduct, raises the question of whether some courts are infringing upon the right to jury trial. This issue clearly concerned the Monsanto Court, as did
the division of powers between the Court and Congress in determining what economic
policy ought to be followed with regard to vertical price fixing. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at
769 (Brennan, J., concurring). See S. REP. No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1569, 1572 (repeal of "Fair Trade" exemption for
resale price maintenance intentionally left "coerce[d] adherence" to suggested resale
prices "illegal").
Advocates of a neoclassical approach to vertical and other restraints ignore the important issue of the institutional constraints on courts in determining what antitrust policy ought to mean. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp, 780 F.2d 1212, 1217
& n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) and articles cited therein.
219
See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 128-47 (I1th ed. 1985); L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAW 47-52, 232-36 (1978).
220
See Pound, supra note 207, at 487 (economic substantive due process causes "lost
respect for courts and law").
221
Fox, supra note 23, at 1152-53 & n.71 (citing Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the
Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555 (1973)); see also H. THORELLI, supra note 203 (ex-
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major goals when they adopted the antitrust laws, goals which have
continued to motivate recent amendments. Professor Fox has summarized these goals as: "(1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity to compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of
consumers, and (4) protection of the competition process as market
governor." 22 2 In her extensive elaboration of the sources and
meanings for these antitrust goals, Professor Fox identifies a central
meaning for the concept of "competition" that has significance in
the context of vertical restraints:
One overarching idea has unified these three concerns (distrust of power, concern for consumers, and commitment to opportunity

for

entrepreneurs):

competition as process.

The

competition process is the preferred governor of markets. If the
impersonal forces of competition, rather than public or private
power, determine market behavior and outcomes, power is by defhaustive study of events and contemporary thought surrounding passage of Sherman
Act).
Judge Bork is the only proponent of neoclassical economic analysis who pays much
attention to the legislative purposes of the federal antitrust laws. He interprets that
history to say that Congress's sole goal in adopting the Sherman Act was to enforce the
neoclassical concept of economic efficiency. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-71
(1978). In fact, the legislative history of the Sherman Act is "overwhelming[ly] to the
contrary," Fox, supra note 23, at 1154 n. 76, indicating that Judge Bork has fitted the
legislative history to his preordained theory, rather than constructed his theory out of
the legislative history. As Professor Leontief observed, it is a case of first developing a
theory, then writing it as a formula, and then defining its terms in such a way as to make
it "true." Leontief, supra note 184, at 29.
222 Fox, supra note 23, at 1182. The goals of antitrust policy in the private sphere
are analogous to the goals of the dormant commerce clause as a limitation upon the
exercise of protectionist state economic regulation. Justice Jackson stated the Court's
philosophy in interpreting the commerce clause as follows:
This Court consistently has rebuffed attempts of states to advance their
own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the state, while generally supporting their
right to impose even burdensome regulations in the interest of local
health and safety....
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that
he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs,
duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look
to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders;
such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535, 539 (1949).
The Court's role in applying this function of the Commerce Clause has evolved
from the mechanical application of formulae (such as direct and indirect effects on commerce, or physical movement in commerce versus an effect on commerce) to a complex
balancing of the competing qualitative interests of the federal and state governments.
The Court usually relies on a competitive process of free trade at the federal level, but at
times curbs the competitive process to serve the public interest in light of the specific
facts of individual cases and the local impact of state-regulated practices.
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inition dispersed, opportunities and incentives for firms without
market power are increased, and the results are acceptable and
fair. Some measure of productive and allocative efficiency is a byproduct, because competition tends to stimulate lowest-cost promore responsively than a visible
duction and allocate resources
22 3
public or private hand.

Advocates of the exclusive use of neoclassical analysis to determine the "ought" of antitrust policy reject Congress's intent regarding vertical and other restraints. They do so in part because they see
the model and its seductive two dimensional graphs as a way to
quantify "reality" and bring certainty to courts' determination of
what the rules ought to mean and how they ought to apply in specific cases. Their solution, however, is a false quantification constructed upon the mysticism of the model's underlying assumptions,
and the theological definitions dictating what facts and values are
relevant to the analysis.
2 24
Neoclassical advocates also dismiss the unavoidable concern
with normative goals other than those their model assumes by
claiming that these other goals are unknowable, undefined, or "poetry." 22 5 But legal analysis constantly confronts a reality that refuses to conform with fixed, preconceived notions; it always deals
with vagueness in the central concepts used in decision making.
When scratched by reality, concepts like "efficiency" and "rational"
are similarly vague and poetic, for they are defined tautologically
from a model which is detached from the reality it purports to characterize. The neoclassicists view the interpretation of vague conFox, supra note 23, at 1154 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the concept of competition, when used to give
meaning to the Sherman Act's ban on contracts in restraint of trade, be understood as a
congressional mandate to ensure that the competitive process be the rule of trade. I
have also suggested that the concept of the competitive process be understood in the
qualitative sense of measuring the impact of the conduct upon the rights of those affected by the restraint and the rights of consumers to the benefits of a competitive process. See Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposalsfor Reducing the
223

Chaos, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593, 1623-27 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Chaos]; Flynn, supra
note 175, at 768-70. "The issue is not a quantitative one of determining how much competition is effected [sic] or destroyed by the practice, although power, relevant market
and quantitative effect may aid in determining qualitative impact in some limited circumstances." Chaos, supra, at 1611 (emphasis in original). Framing the type of competition
the Sherman Act was meant to protect in this way gives effect to congressional purposes
in enacting the antitrust laws, while providing guidance for determining the general
meaning of the common law rules.
224 See Cohen, supra note 182 (every legal decision is unavoidably a moral decision).
225
Judge Bork used the concept of poetry in a debate before President Carter's
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures to describe the
reliance upon social and political values, as well as economic ones, to establish the antitrust laws' meaning. See "No-Fault" Monopolization Proposal Debated by PresidentialConnission on Antitrust Reform, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 880, at A22 (Sept. 14, 1978).

1986]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AFTER MONSANTO

1141

cepts as merely subjective "poetry," as opposed to objective
analysis, and they are equally extreme in their claim that their model
affords objective certainty by reducing to two static dimensions mul2 26
tidimensional, complex, and dynamic phenomena.
Exclusive reliance upon the model provides for the enforcement of the property and contract rights of the restraint's proponent, without regard for the rights of others entangled by the
restraint. Thus, the model does not protect those entangled by the
restraint, including consumers, all of whom have a right to receive
the economic, social, and political benefits of the competitive process mandated by Congress. Furthermore, with all its imperfections, reality requires a more flexible approach than the one dictated
by the model. At best, courts should only use the model to identify
facts diverging from the model's "perfect competition" axiom,
thereby stimulating greater thought about the model itself, the facts
of the dispute, and solutions that acknowledge Congress's goals for
antitrust policy. 2 27 Courts should not use the model to impose fixed
226 Paradoxically, law's over-reliance on formalistic economic analysis is probably a
consequence of the success of the legal realists' attack on formalism in law. Legal formalism depends upon the parsing of legal rules and past decisions to derive the "right"
rule, followed by the deductive application of that rule to the dispute's facts. The realist
attack stressed the superficiality of such an approach and its failure to account for reality,
the insights of other disciplines, and the relevance of the decision maker's values in the
decision-making process. Some proponents of the law and economics approach are
constructively responding to the legal formalism of another age when they offer the
insights of economic analysis (at least empirically based economic analysis) as one
source of wisdom to inform legal decision making about reality. See Flynn, AntitrustJurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Politicaland Social Goals of Antitrust Policy-Introduction, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977) (discussing approaches of different scholars). There
are, of course, a multiplicity of other sources of wisdom to inform antitrust policy. See,
e.g., Sullivan, supra note 193.
Many proponents of the neoclassical approach to law, includingJudges Bork, Posner, and Easterbrook, argue that the neoclassical approach should be the sole consideration in determining what antitrust rules ought to be. In effect, they seek the restoration
of a discredited form of formalism or analytical positivism. They advocate a form of
"flatlaw"-one dimensional thinking which is incapable of discharging the functions
Congress has assigned to the courts in antitrust enforcement or the functions of the
legal process generally. See Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning
and the Development of Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 288 (1984).
Although Terrell cites the use of economic analysis in law as a potential means of rising
above the relatively low level of "flatlaw" analysis, id. at 304-06, the type of analysis
offered by those cited and the insistence that it be used to the exclusion of all other
considerations, constitutes the reimposition of a "flatlaw" type of analysis, or an even
lower form of one dimensional analysis-"linelaw" analysis, id. at 306.
227

True advance can be achieved only through an iterative process in which
improved theoretical formulation raises new empirical questions and the
answers to these questions, in their turn, lead to new theoretical insights.
The "givens" of today become the "unknowns" that will have to be explained tomorrow. This, incidentally, makes untenable the admittedly
convenient methodological position according to which a theorist does
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conceptions of the "ought" of vertical restraints upon a legal process charged with defining the "ought" in light of the "is" and in
light of Congress's antitrust values.
B.

A Proposed Method For The Analysis
Of Vertical Restraints

The courts have swung from the rigid application of a rule
against restraints on alienation to the utilization of a rigid economic
model detached from the reality of the dispute before the court.
Substituting one incomplete set of premises and a wooden methodology for another is a curious jurisprudential development perhaps
driven by a "quest for certitude [that] is so ardent that we pay an
irrational reverence to a technique which uses symbols of certainty,
even though experience again and again warns us that they are delusive." 2 28 The magic of simple definitions and graphs claiming to be
empirically based can easily beguile even the sophisticated. Yet the
certainty and predictability it offers is an illusion, and a dangerous
one at that. The neoclassical model frustrates the congressionally
mandated goals of antitrust policy, the functions and responsibilities
of the judicial process vis-A-vis the other branches of government,
and the obligations of the legal process to deal constructively with
the reality of disputes presented. It imports into the flexible process
of legal analysis a rigid and narrow analytical methodology that is
hostile to the legal decision making's obligation to decide the "is"
and "ought" of disputes in accord with the normative objectives of
the law involved and an evolving understanding of reality sensitive
2 29
to the insights of a variety of disciplines.
The per se/rule of reason dichotomy has generated much of the
present difficulty in antitrust litigation. The Court's early reliance
upon an identical form of rigid deductive reasoning to determine
the legality of vertical restraints led to the diametrically opposed
conclusions it reached in Schwinn and GTE Sylvania. This dichotomy
not need to verify directly the factual assumptions on which he chooses to
base his deductive arguments, provided his empirical conclusions seem to
be correct. The prevalence of such a point of view is, to a large extent,
responsible for the state of splendid isolation in which our discipline [economics] nowadays finds itself.
W. LEONTIEF, ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS 278 (1985).
228 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 644 n.40 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
229 Elsewhere, I have suggested a sensible alternative method of analyzing antitrust
disputes. My suggestion relegates economic analysis and other sources of wisdom for
antitrust policy to a significant but subsidiary role. The role of insight from economics
and other disciplines is to inform the legal process of the implications of the facts in light
of the values underlying the law involved. See Flynn, supra note 175; Chaos, supra note
223.
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is also the source of the Monsanto Court's ambivalence concerning
the continued per se status of vertical price fixing, the ambiguity
over what conduct it will classify as price fixing, and what evidence it
will deem sufficient to prove illegal price fixing. The exclusive use
of a fixed concept of restraints upon alienation, followed by exclusive reliance on the neoclassical analytic model to sort out conflict in
the rights of buyers, sellers, and consumers is not the sole root of
the problem. More fundamentally, the courts have adopted a
mechanical methodology for analyzing antitrust disputes whatever
the rules and the underlying normative assumptions. At one extreme is the fixed methodology of per se analysis, reasoning deductively from a fixed rule applied to an everchanging reality. At the
other extreme is the undefined analytical methodology of the rule of
reason, proceeding inductively without defined standards or meaningful guidelines for the decision maker. A more appropriate methodology combines these positivist and ad hoc realist extremes.
Courts must use a methodology capable of incorporating and
weighing all of the congressionally mandated antitrust policy goals,
in light of the facts involved in the dispute and the insights provided
by a multiplicity of relevant disciplines.
Courts should view the per se and rule of reason methods primarily as a single method of analysis, regarding them as evidentiary
rules establishing presumptions and burdens of proof rather than as
hard and fast substantive rules to be rigidly applied. The Court has,
in fact, sometimes followed this better form of analysis. 230 With this
method, courts use presumptions as tools for investigating the actual facts of cases and the assumptions underlying the relevant
rules. Such an approach recognizes the dynamic interaction of fact
230 See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) ("Indeed, there is often no bright line separatingper
se from Rule of Reason analysis.");Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984) (analyzing competitive impact under both per se and reasonableness standards);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) ("This per se
rule is a valid and useful tool of antitrust policy and enforcement .... But easy labels do
not always supply ready answers.") (footnotes omitted); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) ("In either event, the purpose of the
analysis is to form ajudgment about the competitive significance of the restraint .... ").
Even in the case of "hard core" per se violations there can be considerable litigation over whether the conduct is pursuant to a contract, combination, or conspiracy, see
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), whether the conduct is within the per se category,
see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), or whether there should be some justification for conduct which rebuts the presumption of per se illegality, see Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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and law, and how that interaction determines what ought to be done
in a particular case.
This method of analyzing vertical restraints justifies a relatively
strong presumption of illegality in vertical price fixing cases. Such
conduct impairs a central goal of antitrust policy-the independence of traders to set their own price and the concomitant public
interest in receiving the benefit of one's individual effort. In unusual cases, such as where joint effort is necessary to produce a product, some form of government regulation requires coercive or
collective action to affect pricing or the circumstances indicate that
the competitive process cannot work, some justification or excuse
may warrant a defense to the general rule. Normally, however, the
Court should adopt a relatively strong presumption against vertical
price fixing, particularly where a seller's legitimate goals may be
231
achieved by less restrictive means.
The Court should establish a similarly strong presumption of
illegality when faced with vertically induced refusals to deal, as in
Malley-Duff &Associates, 23 2 even where the refusal to deal is not associated with price fixing. Such conduct denies the victim of the restraint the right to succeed or fail under the regime of a competitive
process, as well as the right to be free from others' unreasonable
and unjustified conspiracies in the enjoyment of property and contract rights. To suggest that plaintiffs in such cases should be left to
their state tort remedies is no answer. Reliance on state remedies
denies congressionally mandated antitrust goals and frustrates Congress's intention to create federal restrictions against restraints
of trade. 233 The suggestion that the antitrust laws "protect competition and not competitors" similarly misses the mark; it is a meaningless cliche that assumes the answer in its concept of
"competition." 23 4
231
See Comanor, supra note 204, at 1001 (advocating strict standards against vertical
restraints in context of established products); Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An
Essay on Vertical Restrictions and Consumer Information, 67 IowA L. REv. 981 (1982) (suggesting alternative solutions to free rider problem that would meet economic objectives
without changing general rule disfavoring vertical restraints).
232 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); see supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
233 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
234
Here the concept of "competition" is defined as promoting consumer welfare
without concern for the rights of competitors Congress intended to protect by guaranteeing a competitive process. A counter-cliche suggests itself: "You can not have competition without competitors." Another favorite and meaningless cliche in antitrust is:
"Bigness isn't necessarily bad," countered by "Bigness isn't necessarily good." Cliches
are not only meaningless, but are often also dangerously misleading if relied upon for
justification of their unstated conclusions.
The concept that the antitrust laws "protect competition and not competitors" as-
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The Court should subject other vertical restraints to a less conclusive presumption of illegality. In some circumstances, a vertical
customer, location, or territorial restraint may produce public benefits or be of such significance to a seller and its product that the
presumption in favor of other private and public rights should yield
to the public good achieved by allowing the restraint. For example,
the need for new entry into an otherwise concentrated market, for
protection of public health and safety, or for the provision of necessary repair or warranty services to the public by the least restrictive
means may justify the imposition of customer, location, or territorial
restraints in some circumstances.2 3 5 The facts of these individual
cases, in light of the values underlying the antitrust laws, should determine the "ought" of the rules in light of the "is" before the
court.
Where applying the rule of reason to a case is appropriate, however, the analysis should not normally require proof of a relevant
market and market power. Many lower courts have unthinkingly applied this requirement in rule of reason cases, 2 36 but the leading
sumes that protecting competitors is necessarily inconsistent with competition. This
idea operates on an erroneous assumption about the congressionally mandated goals of
antitrust policy and indulges in an assumption which contains the either/or fallacy that
there are only two choices in evaluating vertical market restraints: they are either wholly
pro-competitive or wholly anti-competitive.
The either/or fallacy indulged in by proponents of an exclusive reliance on neoclassical analysis is dictated by their assumption of perfect competition. While a particular
figure in Euclidian geometry may be either a square or not a square because it can not be
both things at once given the closed definitional system, the messy world of reality often
presents us with situations of a dual character. This is particularly true of economic
activity and its interaction with public policy where the meaning of rules shifts in light of
the changes in what we call facts; where our words articulating rules to govern reality as
we understand it evolve in light of changes in our ideology; and where the insights of
different disciplines adds to or detracts from our understanding of reality. A legal process suffers from a dangerous hardening of the arteries when it permits itself to be captured by an "either/or" mentality and lets the meaning of the normative objectives of
the law become frozen to serve the unexamined ideological preferences of a decision
maker. See supra note 182.
235
See Comanor, supra note 204, at 1001-02 (discussing new entry); Levmore, supra
note 231, at 982-83 (discussing safety and new entry).
236 See, e.g., Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985);
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); General Leaseways,
Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984); Oreck Corp. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). But see Malley
Duff& Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.
1986),Judge Bork held that the plaintiff must prove a relevant market and power in that
market in a § 1 horizontal restraint case analyzed under the rule of reason. Id. at 229.
Rothery is likely to become the leading case advocating this position, as well as the position that group boycotts are not per se illegal. Although the court below, Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1984), aft'd, 792 F.2d
210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), decided the case on other grounds, Judge Bork used the opportu-
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Supreme Court rule of reason cases do not mandate this approach. 23 7 Courts which require this showing implicitly assume the
narrow antitrust policy goals of neoclassical economic analysis and
consequently are captured by its rigid definition of "competition."
In addition to the model's problems with congressional intent and
its self-serving definition of competition, discussed above, this requirement converts a Sherman Act section 1 case into a Sherman
Act section 2 case by focusing on structure rather than behavior in
conflict with the statute's language and meaning. 238 The requirement thus makes impractical the effective litigation of cases where
legitimate claims of unreasonableness should be evaluated by the
courts.
The classic statement of the rule of reason in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States 23 9 contained no requirement that the plaintiff
prove a relevant market and power or an injury in a defined relevant
market. The "rule of reason" instead requires a court to examine
several factors: the peculiarities of the trade or industry involved,
the power of the participants to the restraint, the horizontal or vertical nature of the restraint, the purpose and effect of the restraint,
the public and private benefits and detriments of the restraint, and
the availability of less restrictive alternatives to avoid the plan's detriments and achieve its benefits. 240 Although an evaluation of the
nity to assert his unsubstantiated position that the sole goal of antitrust is to insure
economic "efficiency" as defined by the neoclassical model. Not surprisingly, Judge
Bork therefore concluded a restraint must be shown to injure competition in a relevant
market before it can be found unreasonable; likewise, proof of power in a relevant market is required in order to show an injury to competition. 792 F.2d at 229. The opinion
thus blurs the distinction between § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act by converting § 1
analysis into a structural analysis rather than a conduct analysis. After Rothery, it is difficult to see what significance § I of the Sherman Act has as an antitrust prohibition distinct from § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act.
237
See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986); NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Co., 747 F.2d 511 (1984).
238
See supra note 236.
239
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
240
See generally L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN, & H. FIRST, supra note 176, at 351-54 (discussing rule of reason analysis). Such an analytic process is analogous to the balancing
process followed in dormant commerce clause cases, where the courts examine benefits,
detriments, purpose, effect, less restrictive alternatives, and other factors in assessing
the state and federal interests involved. Both inquiries require a balancing process sensitive to the facts of specific cases and the normative values underlying the adoption of
the commerce clause or the antitrust laws, as the case may be. Rigid formulae or labels
masking the underlying reasons for the decision seldom work for long because they fail
to identify the policies involved or to analyze all of the facts in light of the relevant
policies. For a survey of the evolution of the Court's role in applying the dormant commerce clause from mechanical formulae through unexplained labels to a balancing process, see G. GuNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 231-317 (11 th ed. 1985). Antitrust analysis
under § 1 of the Sherman Act appears to be stuck in the 19th century mode of mechani-

1986]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AFTER MONSANTO

1147

relevant market and a party's power in that market may be relevant
in some circumstances to evaluate adequately the restraint's effect
or its benefits or detriments, such an evaluation is clearly not mandated in all cases by either Supreme Court precedent or antitrust
legislation.
Furthermore, analysis of the relevant market and market power
cannot form a necessary element in most vertical restraint cases.
The issues in most cases involve a balancing of the property and
contract rights and rationalities of plaintiff and defendant in light of
the antitrust law's multiple goals, the benefits the public is entitled
to receive from reliance upon a competitive process, the facts, and
the insights of disciplines (including empirically based insights from
economics) which may serve to inform the legal process. Requirements to the contrary, like those contained in the Department of
Justice's "Vertical Restraints Guidelines," 24 1 subvert the purposes
of the antitrust laws, misconstrue the law applicable to vertical restraints and the reality in which they occur, and mislead the unwary
as to the elements of a rule of reason case. The House of Representatives has gone to the trouble of expressly repudiating the socalled "Guidelines" because they are inconsistent with the congressional purpose in adopting the antitrust laws. 24 2 The courts should
also repudiate the Guidelines as inconsistent with the function of a
judicial process that must apply Congress's policies in enforcing the
antitrust laws. Furthermore, they are inconsistent with the judicial
process in that they impose a wooden methodology without regard
for the normative values Congress established through the antitrust
laws. Finally, the guidelines prevent proper consideration of the
facts of individual cases by imposing a set of narrow, unrealistic, and
frozen assumptions from another era.

cal formulae and labels like "per se," "rule of reason," "efficiency," "relevant market,"
and so on.
241
50 Fed Reg. 6263 (Feb. 14, 1985); see 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,473 (analyzing guidelines); ArrrRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1199, at 193 (Jan. 24, 1985)
(same). The National Association of Attorneys General has adopted vertical guidelines
which depart significantly from those of the federal government. See State Attorneys
General Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,478; NAAG Adopts
Alternative Guidelines to Govern Vertical Restraints of Trade, [July-Dec.] ANTrrRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1243, at 978, 996 (Dec. 5, 1985).
242
H.R. Res. 303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess, 131 CONG. REC. H11390, HI 1391 (daily ed.
Dec. 9, 1985) (stating that Guidelines "(1) are not an accurate expression of the Federal
antitrust laws or of congressional intent with regard to the application of such laws...;
(2) shall not be accorded any force of law or be treated by the courts of the United States
as binding or persuasive; and (3) should be recalled by the Attorney General"); see also
H.R. REP. No. 399, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
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CONCLUSION

One cannot survey the post-Monsanto litigation without concluding that the law is presently in a state of disarray. There is confusion with respect to the sufficiency of evidence to send a case to
the jury on the issue of conspiracy, the proper elements of "price
fixing," the distinction (and the purpose of drawing a distinction)
between horizontal and vertical restraints, and whether courts
should presume vertically imposed territorial and customer restraints lawful in most circumstances. At a more basic level, the
courts are ideologically confused over the purpose and goals of antitrust laws. This state of affairs has not only generated uncertainty
and excessive litigation, but has also spawned a widespread movement to regulate vertical market restraints through an array of complex federal and state franchising laws. 24 3 These laws attempt to

respond to the perceived failure of antitrust policy to account for all
the interests and values wrapped up in vertical market restraints
through flexible and realistic analytical methodology. The laws thus
reflect dissatisfaction with the courts' growing allegiance to a narrow ideology and methodology which offers a false coherence, predictability, and certainty.
Judicial reliance upon the neoclassical model provides a false
coherence because it ignores the congressional goals of antitrust
policy and the legal process's methodology and purpose. This reliance creates a false predictability because it depends exclusively
upon an abstract model of a world which does not exist and precludes courts from grappling with the reality of the disputes antitrust policy is committed to resolve. Finally, this reliance creates a
false certainty because it fails to account for the long-term consequences of its assumptions. The legal process and antitrust policy
cannot escape a constant confrontation between the values underlying the assumptions behind their rules and methodology, evolving
reality, and normative values. Sooner or later, reality and the logic
243
The growing list of federal and state special franchise laws have been adopted in
light of the failure of antitrust policy to deal constructively with the reality of franchise
relationships generally, as well as characteristics of franchising not readily controlled by
antitrust policy (e.g., fraud in the sale of franchises requiring disclosure regulation).
Over the past 10 years there has been a gradual increase in special franchise legislation
corresponding to the gradual decrease in the use of antitrust policy to regulate vertical
market relationships. In some instances, special franchise regulation appears to be potentially injurious to competition and the competitive process. See L. SCHWARTZ, J.
FLYNN & H. FIRST, supra note 176, at 782-97 (surveying federal and state franchise statutes apparently based on concern for protecting franchisees rather than competitive
process); see also Braun, Policy Issues of Franchising,14 Sw. U.L. REV. 155 (1984) (general
survey of growth of franchise regulation); Faruki, The Defense of Terminated Dealer Litigation: A Survey of Legal and Strategic Considerations,46 OHIO ST. L.J. 925 (1985) (same).
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of legal analysis must be given their due. Courts and scholars pretending otherwise only postpone the reckoning and aggravate its
price.

